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99 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021)

CRIMINAL LAW x ADDICTION *
DAWINDER S. SIDHU **
When an individual with an addiction commits an unlawful act that is
symptomatic of the disorder, is the act involuntary and therefore beyond the
reach of criminal law? The federal circuit courts are divided on this question.
The majority view posits that an individual may be held criminally responsible
for all unlawful acts, regardless of whether the acts are symptomatic of the
disease of addiction. The en banc Fourth Circuit recently broke from these
circuits, suggesting instead that an act that is symptomatic of the disease of
addiction is involuntary and cannot be punished.
Both models are flawed. The first approach (the binary status-conduct
distinction) asks only whether the individual committed an identifiable act.
But this approach ignores the conditions under which the defendant drank or
used and withdraws from the defendant the opportunity to make a showing of
involuntariness based on their specific circumstances. For its part, the second
approach (the categorical-involuntary model) accepts conclusory
representations that the disease of addiction negates choice, without probing to
any degree whether these representations are supported by any facts.
Therefore, a third model is necessary.
This Article proposes that new paradigm. It argues that courts should engage in
meaningful individualized inquiries as to the voluntary or involuntary nature
of the acts in question. Drawing on medical information, formal treatment
programs, twelve-step fellowship programs, and the related disability context,
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this Article defines that fact-specific process, guiding courts and practitioners as
to what such an individualized showing would entail. This prudent, case-bycase approach would best respect the unique circumstances of the individual
facing criminal sanction as well as our fluid, evolving understanding of
addiction itself.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1084
I.
WHAT IS ADDICTION: HISTORY, DIAGNOSIS, AND
TREATMENT ................................................................................ 1088
A. Historical Understanding .......................................................... 1088
B. The Disease Model ................................................................... 1094
C. Medical and Therapeutic Treatment ........................................... 1096
II.
LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADDICTION...............................................1105
A. Intoxication and Insanity............................................................1105
B. Supreme Court Guideposts .......................................................... 1110
1. Robinson ............................................................................ 1110
2. Powell ................................................................................ 1112
C. Two Models ............................................................................. 1115
1. The Status-Conduct Distinction ........................................ 1115
2. The Categorical-Involuntary Model ................................... 1116
III. AN INDIVIDUALIZED, EMPIRICAL MODEL .................................... 1121
A. Conduct and Choice.................................................................. 1122
B. Addiction and Choice ................................................................ 1124
C. Addiction and the Purposes of Punishment ................................... 1133
D. Evidence of Choice ................................................................... 1136
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 1140
INTRODUCTION
Criminal law may be likened to the outer limits of acceptable behavior in
American society. Only when an individual crosses the line and does so
voluntarily may the individual be subject to criminal punishment. 1 As stated
by the prominent jurist E. Barrett Prettyman, a “basic” axiom of criminal law
is that if a person “is not a free agent, or not making a choice, or . . . not acting
freely,” that person “is outside the postulate of the law of punishment.” 2
This Article addresses the application of this foundational principle to
addiction. 3 It specifically explores whether an act that is symptomatic of the
1. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 206 (3d ed. 2000) (“A bodily movement, to
qualify as an act forming the basis of criminal liability, must be voluntary.”).
2. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
3. “Addiction” generally refers to the chronic use of drugs or alcohol notwithstanding the
adverse consequences of such use. See Substance Abuse and Addiction Information, UNIV. TENN.
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disease of addiction may be deemed compelled by the disease and therefore
involuntary for purposes of criminal law. Consider an individual who is
addicted to heroin during the opioid crisis. 4 Assume further that this person
has overdosed from heroin use and been revived by emergency responders
multiple times. 5 Can it be a crime for this person to be a known or habitual
user of heroin? Can it be a crime for this person to use heroin? What if the
person used heroin to avoid acute withdrawal symptoms, including anxiety,
vomiting, and loss of bowel control? 6
The federal circuit courts are divided on these questions. The primary
reason for the split is that the courts diverge as to the proper interpretation of
two Supreme Court opinions from the 1960s—the last time the Court
squarely addressed the intersection of criminal law and addiction. 7 A majority
of circuits posit that an individual with an addiction can be held criminally
responsible for their acts, regardless of whether the relevant acts are
symptomatic of an addiction. 8 Under this status-conduct formulation, the
individual may be held criminally liable in the second (an individual who uses
heroin) and third (an individual who uses to avert severe withdrawal
symptoms) scenarios provided above because they both contain an actus reus.
The en banc Fourth Circuit recently broke from its sister circuits, suggesting
instead that actions symptomatic of the disease of addiction are nonvolitional
and therefore beyond the reach of the criminal law. 9 Under this rule, the
individual with an addiction cannot be held criminally responsible in any of
the aforementioned situations because any actions are involuntary on account
of the disease of addiction. The difference in principle thus produces different
legal outcomes.

HEALTH SCI. CTR., https://uthsc.edu/comc/well-being/substance-abuse-information-chattanooga
.php [https://perma.cc/CXC7-XTHV] (last updated Sept. 28, 2020) (“Addiction is a complex
condition, a brain disease that is manifested by compulsive substance use despite harmful
consequence. People with addiction . . . keep using alcohol or a drug even when they know it will
cause problems.”). While “alcohol use disorder” and “substance use disorder” are the preferred terms
in clinical settings, see infra Section I.C, this Article elects to use the lay terminology of “addiction.”
4. For an excellent overview of the development of the opioid epidemic in the United States,
see generally BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY THAT
ADDICTED AMERICA (2018).
5. This is not uncommon. See, e.g., Kate Ryan, Montgomery Co. Sees Slight Drop in Opioid
Overdose Deaths, WTOP (Oct. 18, 2019, 3:50 PM), http://wtop.com/montgomery-county/2019/
10/montgomery-county-sees-slight-drop-in-opioid-overdose-deaths [https://perma.cc/5LQT-ETVW]
(sharing the story of a woman, now in recovery, who overdosed eighteen times).
6. Jeffery Juergens, Heroin Withdrawal and Detox, ADDICTION CTR. (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.addictioncenter.com/drugs/heroin/withdrawal-detox/ [https://perma.cc/QD4U-SUET].
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. See infra Section II.C.1.
9. See infra Section II.C.2.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021)

1086

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

Both models are flawed. The first approach—which focuses only on
whether the criminal punishment follows some actus reus 10—prevents the
individual with an addiction to alcohol or drugs 11 from being able to make an
evidentiary showing that their specific circumstances precluded their ability to
comply with the law. 12 At the same time, the second approach—which asks
only whether the defendant possesses an addiction—ignores the general
capacity of the individual with an addiction to exercise choice and therefore
absolves the individual of criminal responsibility without probing whether
individual circumstances prevented the individual from addressing their
addiction and its adverse manifestations. 13
A new model is needed. This Article argues that courts should engage in
meaningful individualized inquiries as to the voluntary or involuntary nature
of the acts in question. 14 This Article draws on medical information, formal
treatment programs, twelve-step fellowship programs, and the related
disability context to define this process and to guide judges and practitioners
as to what such an individualized showing would entail. This prudent, caseby-case approach would best respect the unique circumstances of the
individual facing criminal sanction as well as our evolving understanding of
addiction itself.
This Article begins by establishing a historical and conceptual baseline
for the discussion of the three competing models. Part I of this Article
specifically offers an overview of the early understanding of addiction in the
United States; explains the prevailing disease model of addiction; and
addresses how addiction is currently treated, covering both formal
rehabilitation programs and more peer-led twelve-step fellowship programs.
Building on this foundation, Part II turns to law, noting how issues
implicating addiction have arisen in the criminal law concepts of intoxication
and insanity. Part II then summarizes Robinson v. California 15 and Powell v.

10. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both a
culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur.”). The
former corresponds with “an evil-meaning mind” and the latter with “an evil-doing hand.” Morissette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
11. This Article uses the term “individual with alcohol or drug disease” and variations thereof.
With the exception of quotes from court opinions and others, this Article avoids “addict” and
variations thereof, in consideration of guidance on appropriate terminology in the addiction context.
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS: A GUIDE TO THE USE OF LANGUAGE 12 (2004) [hereinafter
SAMHSA], http://www.naabt.org/documents/Languageofaddictionmedicine.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E394-GGFY]. This Article also focuses on the possible criminal liability of an individual with alcohol
or substance use disorder. It does not address other forms of addiction.
12. See infra Section III.A.
13. See infra Section III.B.
14. See infra Section III.C.
15. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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Texas 16—the Supreme Court’s last two major pronouncements on criminal law
and addiction—and identifies the two interpretive camps that have emerged
from these twin opinions. Part III argues that these two approaches are
contrary to scientific information on addiction, contrary to treatment models,
and even contrary to the comparable legal regime governing disability. This
Article then makes the case for the third, evidentiary model as the most
clinically and legally defensible means by which to analyze when the disease of
addiction renders an act involuntary for purposes of criminal law. Part IV
concludes.
Courts, commentators, litigants, and the public have struggled to
identify the proper relationship between criminal law and addiction,
particularly because the subject of addiction implicates complex and
controversial considerations of medicine, morality, and social attitudes. 17
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in this area of criminal law, more
definitive guidance for courts and others is critically necessary. The Supreme
Court last addressed criminal law and addiction in the 1960s. 18 In 2019, an en
banc Fourth Circuit split 8–7 on the meaning and applicability of those
cases. 19 The fair administration of criminal justice is undermined by such
substantive uncertainty and disparity. This Article aims to provide that muchneeded conceptual clarity, translating medical and treatment information into
optimal legal rules, thereby giving courts and litigants a more durable and
sound process by which to adjudicate questions of criminal responsibility and
addiction. 20 As the nation remains in the throes of an opioid crisis,
determining whether and when individuals with an addiction to drugs or

16. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
17. For example, consider a recent exchange, which played out in the pages of The Baltimore
Sun, on whether and when the criminal justice system should intersect with addiction. See George
Hammerbacher, Should Police Look the Other Way When Addicts Steal?, BALT. SUN (Nov.
24, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/readers-respond/bs-ed-rr-drug-decriminalizationletter-20201124-uvl7sw4dkzcc3jgvoek5lribme-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8J4P-DWHS
(dark
archive)]; Dale Klatzker, Opinion, Gaudenzia: Partnering with Justice System Necessary for Effective
Addiction Treatment, BALT. SUN (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bsed-op-1109-gaudenzia-treatment-20201106-heurk4unynh5db7mgoli76od7i-story.html [https://perma
.cc/Q2M9-FZW3 (dark archive)]; Brendan Saloner, Letter to the Editor, Drug Treatment Works Better
Without Police Involvement, BALT. SUN (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/
opinion/readers-respond/bs-ed-rr-drug-treatment-police-letter-20201118-6ffvyhfjqveqziibqusznwl6ka
-story.html [https://perma.cc/MVR2-F7VT (dark archive)].
18. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660; Powell, 392 U.S. at 514–15.
19. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
20. This Article addresses only the threshold question of whether criminal liability is
appropriate for conduct symptomatic of addiction and not the second-order issue of the form and
length of the resulting punishment. As a preliminary matter, however, punishment that serves
rehabilitative purpose would be the most sensible and defensible to help the individual better address
the manifestations of their disease, reduce the prospects for recidivism, and yet ensure that the
individual meets some consequences for stepping over the lines of the law.
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alcohol may face criminal penalties (and associated collateral consequences)
for symptomatic conduct cannot wait and matters in real terms.
I. WHAT IS ADDICTION: HISTORY, DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT
This part addresses the basics of addiction. First, it describes how
addiction has been conceptualized historically, tracing attempts to understand
addiction in early America through Prohibition. Second, it discusses the
current, prevailing disease model of addiction, summarizing how alcohol and
drugs affect the brain and noting criticisms of the disease model. Third, it
explores how addiction is treated, sketching formal clinical options and peerbased twelve-step fellowship programs.
A.

Historical Understanding

Intoxicants occupy a complicated space in American history and society.
In general, that history suggests generally permissive attitudes towards heavy
consumption of alcohol, accompanied by attempts to address excessive
drinking and its harms. In colonial and early America, “[m]ost of the
population, from youth to old age, consumed [alcohol], often at every meal,
from breakfast through supper.” 21 In 1790, “an average American over fifteen
years old drank just under six gallons of absolute alcohol each year.” 22 This
amount rose to over seven gallons in 1810. 23 The trend continued. “[I]n the
1820’s the typical American man was putting away half a pint of [corn
whiskey] every day.” 24 “[D]uring the first decades of the 19th century . . .
Americans [went] on a collective bender that confronted the young republic
with its first major public-health crisis . . . .” 25
Noteworthy figures in the founding generation shared the general
public’s taste for alcohol. Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, purchased
two 126-gallon casks of madeira per year. 26 Benjamin Franklin rather famously
21. Lisa Lucas, Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-First
Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 899, 914 (2005) (quoting Richard F. Hamm,
Short Euphorias Followed by Long Hangovers: Unintended Consequences of the Eighteenth and Twenty-first
Amendments, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 164, 166
(David E. Kyvig ed., 2000)).
22. MARK EDWARD LENDER & JAMES KIRBY MARTIN, DRINKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY
14 (1982).
23. Id. at 46.
24. Lucas, supra note 21, at 915 (quoting Michael Pollan, The (Agri)Cultural Contradictions of
Obesity, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 12, 2003, at 41, 42).
25. Id.
26. Jean Edward Smith, Sallie E. Marshall Hardy’s ‘John Marshall’, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 309, 310
(2000). Other Justices are known to have enjoyed alcohol. Justice Thurgood Marshall, for example,
drank bourbon. See Elena Kagan, For Justice Marshall, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1126–27 (1993). Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s favorite lunch apparently consisted of a cheeseburger and beer. See Michael Q.
Eagan, Chief Justice Rehnquist: Soft Shoes Below the Bench, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 1986), https://
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remarked that wine was “proof that God loves us.” 27 John Adams drank hard
cider before breakfast. 28 To be fair, some framers voiced concerns related to
alcohol as well. James Madison claimed that liquor was “inconsistent with the
purity of moral and republican principles.” 29 Adams became “so concerned
about the level of drunkenness that he proposed limiting the number of
taverns . . . .” 30 Even Franklin concurred, calling taverns a “[p]est to
Society.” 31
The English, the colonies, and then the states prohibited drunkenness,
showing little regard for those who overindulged. 32 The English effort to
regulate intoxicating substances stretches back to at least 1606, in the form of a
statute that condemned “the loathsom and odious sin of drunkenness,” “the
root and foundation of many other enormous sins, as bloodshed, stabbing,

www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-06-22-op-20810-story.html [https://perma.cc/S3A6-8Y8Y
(dark archive)]. Justice Brett Kavanaugh has professed his love of beer. See Frank Bruni, Opinion,
Brett Kavanaugh Loves His Beer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
09/29/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-beer-politics.html [https://perma.cc/ZPJ3-M3BM (dark archive)].
Justices’ relationships with alcohol are not all positive. Justice Thurgood Marshall’s father was an
alcoholic, David J. Garrow, The Symbolic Justice, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1998, at 42, 42 (book
review), as was Justice Sotomayor’s father, SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 25 (2013).
Justice Clarence Thomas recounts his own heavy drinking. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Clarence
Thomas: A Silent Justice Speaks Out, ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2007, 4:29 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/
TheLaw/story?id=3664638 [https://perma.cc/E7NM-5G2P]. Justice William O. Douglas was known
to be an alcoholic. Then-Judge Posner blasted Justice Douglas for his “heavy drinking” and other
attributes, calling him “one of the most unwholesome figures in modern American political
history . . . .” Richard A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, 27, 27 (book
review). Though not a justice, U.S. District Judge John Pickering was impeached and removed from
office in large part because of his drinking. See NANCY MAVEETY, GLASS AND GAVEL: THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT AND ALCOHOL 12 (2019).
27. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2476–77 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
28. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 36 (2001).
29. LENDER & MARTIN, supra note 22, at 39; see also Letter from George Washington to
Thomas Green (Mar. 31, 1789), in From George Washington to Thomas Green, 31 March 1789, NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-01-020364 [https://perma.cc/SK68-RB99] (writing that “drink . . . is the source of all evil—and the ruin of
half the workmen in this Country”).
30. Harry Gene Levine, The Discovery of Addiction: Changing Conceptions of Habitual Drunkenness
in America, 2 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 43, 44 (1985).
31. Id. at 145. For an informative discussion of widespread alcohol use during the founding
period, see Alan Taylor, Alcohol Use in the Early American Republic, C-SPAN (Mar. 5,
2014), https://www.c-span.org/video/?317982-1/lecture-early-us-alcohol-consumption [https://perma
.cc/47JY-5NZ3].
32. The distaste of alcohol extends back millennia, prior to the existence of the Anglo-American
legal tradition. See Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F. Supp. 850, 853 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(“Who hath woe? who hath sorrow? who hath contentions? who hath babbling? who hath wounds
without cause? who hath redness of eyes? They that tarry long at the wine; they that go to seek mixed
wine.” (quoting Proverbs 23:29–30)).
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murder, swearing, fornication, adultery, and such like.” 33 Similarly, New York
laws of 1665–1675 forbade those “overtaken with Drink.” 34 Comparable
statutes were enacted in early America. 35 Punishments in this era for
violations of such laws included whippings and the stocks. 36
Such statutes reflected the prevailing moral opprobrium attached to
individuals deemed to be “drunkards.” The same statutes prohibiting excessive
drinking also applied to “vagrant persons,” lying, gambling, prostitution,
witchcraft, cock-fighting, and profane cursing. 37 Fueling the negative social
perception of the “drunkard” was the general sense that excessive drinking was
a product of an individual’s choice and thus the proper subject of social
judgment and legal punishment. In 1754, for example, Jonathan Edwards
wrote that the desire of the “drunkard” to drink cannot be attributed to
anything other than “choice” or “election.” 38 Edwards rejected the argument
that the “drunkard” is unable to stop drinking: “It cannot be truly said . . . that
a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his
mouth.” 39
One chief exception to the general view that drunkenness represented a
choice appears in the writings of Dr. Benjamin Rush, who served as Surgeon
General of the Continental Army, signed the Declaration of Independence,
and worked as a physician and professor. 40 Rush appreciated the powerful
hold that addiction had on the individual. He recounted the words of an
individual addicted to alcohol: “Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room,
and were a cannon constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not
refrain from passing before that cannon, in order to get at the rum.” 41 Rush
claimed that, while “[t]he use of strong drink is at first the effect of free
33. Jayesh M. Rathod, Distilling Americans: The Legacy of Prohibition on U.S. Immigration Law, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 781, 792 n.55 (2014) (citing (1606) 4 Jacob’s Ch Rep. I, c. 5 (Eng.) (third alteration
in original)).
34. EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF NEW YORK, 1665–1693, at 133 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978).
35. FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 23 (John D. Cushing ed., 1982)
(authorizing arrest for those “guilty of Drunkenness”); COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 139
(1889) (permitting punishment of those “overtaken with drink”); DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF NEW
JERSEY, 1709–1861, at 896 (Lucius Q.C. Elmer ed., 1861) (labeling “common drunkards” as
“disorderly persons”); 3 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1700–1810, at 178
(1810) (making any person who engages in “excessive drinking of spiritous, vinous, or other strong
liquors” subject to conviction).
36. Levine, supra note 30, at 44.
37. See, e.g., FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 35, at 23; COLONIAL
LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 35, at 139; DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, supra
note 35, at 896; LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 35, at 177–83.
38. JOHNATHAN EDWARDS, FREEDOM OF THE WILL 10, 231 (1754).
39. Id. at 37.
40. Dr. Benjamin Rush: Father of American Psychiatry, PENN MED., https://www.uphs.upenn.edu/
paharc/timeline/1751/tline7.html [https://perma.cc/YF7E-WVT6].
41. BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS, UPON THE DISEASE OF
THE MIND 266 (1812).
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agency,” habitual drinking “takes place from necessity.” 42 At this point,
drinking is no longer an act of free will but rather the product of a “disease of
the will,” he concluded. 43
Rush’s writings, prescient from today’s vantage point, occupied a
minority position during his time. The dominant approach was grounded in
concerns about the immorality of drunkenness and the social harms stemming
from it. 44 A series of cases from the late nineteenth century reflect the
majority view. In them, the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that states
could regulate alcohol under their police powers, as alcohol implicates
governmental interests in health, safety, and morality. 45 Echoing the 1606
English statute, the Supreme Court in 1887 confessed that “we cannot shut
out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the
public morals, and the public safety, may be endangered by the general use of
intoxicating drinks . . . .” 46 “[N]or [can we ignore] the fact, established by
statistics accessible to every one, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and
crime existing in the country are, in some degree at least, traceable to this
evil,” the Court continued. 47
Abraham Lincoln himself entered the fray. Addressing temperance
advocates, he stated, “[T]he practice of drinking [intoxicating beverages] is
just as old as the world itself . . . .” 48 “When all such of us, as have now
reached the years of maturity, . . . we found intoxicating liquor, recognized by
everybody, used by every body, and repudiated by nobody,” he added. 49 It is
true, Lincoln acknowledged, that “many were greatly injured by it.” 50 But, he
said, “none seemed to think the injury arose from the use of a bad thing, but
from the abuse of a very good thing.” 51 He shared the hope that there should be
no more “drunkards” in society, suggesting that the way to achieve this
42. Id.
43. Id. at 269.
44. For arguments on how this regulatory power was applied to suppress slaves, see Frederick
Douglass, Address Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland, on Intemperance Viewed in Connection with
Slavery (Feb. 18, 1846), in Yale Macmillan Ctr., Intemperance Viewed in Connection with Slavery, YALE
U., https://glc.yale.edu/intemperance-viewed-connection-slavery [https://perma.cc/YB6C-MANY].
For arguments on how this regulatory power was applied to minority and immigrant communities
generally, see Rathod, supra note 33, at 798–814.
45. See, e.g., Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201, 206 (1884); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25,
32 (1877); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 133 (1873); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 504, 532–33 (1847).
46. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887).
47. Id.
48. Abraham Lincoln, Temperance Address (Feb. 22, 1842), in Temperance Address, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ONLINE, http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/temperance.htm [https://
perma.cc/TGE4-MYZS].
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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outcome is “entreaty and persuasion,” not “the thundering tones of anathema
and denunciation.” 52
Notwithstanding Lincoln’s protestations, the temperance movement
gained momentum, reaching a tipping point with Prohibition. As Justice
Stevens wrote, “[T]he moral condemnation of the use of alcohol as a beverage
represented . . . the views of a sufficiently large majority of the population to
warrant the rare exercise of the power to amend the Constitution on two
occasions.” 53 First, the Eighteenth Amendment, ratified in 1919, prohibited
the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors.” 54 Prohibition
failed due to states ceding enforcement of the amendment to federal
authorities, the inability of federal authorities to effectuate meaningful
enforcement, and the sense that the amendment itself lacked legitimacy. 55
Second, the Twenty-First Amendment, ratified in 1933, repealed the federal
prohibition against transacting alcohol in commerce and yet also left open the
opportunity for the states to enact their own prohibitions. 56
America’s historical experience with narcotics—opioids derived naturally
or synthetically from poppy plants—is complicated as well. Narcotics were
used for medical and other legitimate purposes. In 1804, after Aaron Burr shot
Alexander Hamilton, for example, doctors gave Hamilton an opium-based
tincture to alleviate his pain. 57 In 1810, Friedrich Sertürner discovered
morphine, a substance ten times more powerful than opium that Sertürner
acknowledged had addictive qualities. 58 During the Civil War, however,
doctors gave ailing soldiers morphine as a painkiller and sedative, ignoring
Sertürner’s warnings and erroneously believing that addiction could be
avoided if the morphine was injected using hypodermic needles. 59 A hundred
thousand veterans of the war developed dependence on drugs or alcohol,
which was referred to as “army disease” or “soldier’s disease.” 60 In 1874, a
chemist researching nonaddictive alternatives to morphine discovered
heroin. 61 Twice as powerful as morphine, heroin’s medical benefits (for
example, to suppress a cough, treat a cold, or act as a sedative) were promoted

52. Id.
53. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 494–95 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
55. See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2006).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1; see also Br. for Illinois, et al. at 5, Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Blair, 139 S. Ct. 783 (2018) (No. 18-96), 2018 WL 6168781, at *5 (describing the
two primary regulatory models followed by states in the aftermath of Prohibition).
57. MACY, supra note 4, at 21.
58. Id. at 21–22.
59. Id. at 22.
60. Id.; Charles G. Hoff, Jr., Drug Abuse, 51 MIL. L. REV. 147, 162 (1971).
61. MACY, supra note 4, at 23.
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and its addictive potential was downplayed. 62 By 1914, consistent with the
temperance movement’s crackdown on alcohol, heroin and other narcotics
were prohibited. 63 Social judgments accompanied the legislative responses,
with individuals addicted to drugs branded as “junkies” or worse. 64
Following the end of Prohibition, however, alcohol and drugs proceeded
along different legal tracks. The consumption of alcohol itself has been largely
untouched, with the main exception being the requirement that anyone
purchasing or consuming alcohol be of a minimum age. 65 That aside, the
regulation of alcohol has focused primarily on ancillary or secondary issues,
such as driving while under the influence of alcohol or being disorderly in
public while intoxicated. By contrast, while some drugs, such as LSD,
continued to be permitted for a brief period due to supposed medical or
psychiatric benefits, the consumption of narcotics in any amount became
strictly prohibited. 66 Such prohibitions began in earnest with the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act of 1932 67 and were heightened with the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970, 68 which remains in effect today and reflects the
negative social perceptions and stringent regulatory treatment of drugs in the
modern era. The Controlled Substances Act categorizes substances by tiers,
according to their effects upon the person and their potential for abuse. 69
Rising concerns about drug use and associated violence in the 1980s
contributed to the current, “tough” model of criminal justice. Following the
tragic death of budding basketball star Len Bias from acute cocaine
intoxication and the resulting national public outcry, 70 Congress rushed to
enact the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 71 This statute set forth severe
mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses and established the infamous
one-hundred-to-one ratio of the quantity needed to trigger mandatory

62. Id. at 23–24.
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id.
65. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1987) (upholding Congress’ use of the
Spending Clause to incentivize states to bring their minimum drinking ages up to twenty-one).
66. See Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921) (affirming the authority of a state to
“exercise . . . its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous
and habit-forming drugs”).
67. UNIF. NARCOTIC DRUG ACT, § 2, 9B U.L.A. 423 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L. 1932).
68. See generally Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801–971) (creating five drug schedules and implementing the National Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, among other actions).
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 812.
70. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Evolving Role of the United States Sentencing Commission, 33 FED.
SENT’G REP. 3, 4–5 (2020).
71. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3,207 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 841) (strengthening federal efforts at “eradicating” illicit drug sales and use).
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minimums for “crack” and “powder” cocaine, 72 respectively, a ratio that has
since been reduced to eighteen-to-one through the Fair Sentencing Act. 73
Today, the significant social costs and public health consequences of
alcohol and drugs are well documented. 74 The retributive impulses of the
1980s have tempered somewhat. A rehabilitative approach to low-level,
nonviolent drug and alcohol offenses, typified by drug courts and similar
treatment-centric programs, has emerged as an effective, evidence-based
alternative to incarceration. 75 Moreover, there is an understanding that
incarceration as a response to drug-related offenses carries significant,
generational costs of its own. As Judge Amal Thapar has observed, “Kids who
lost their parents to drugs . . . will now lose them again to jail. With broken
homes and terrible role models, they, too, are likely to turn to drugs.” 76 While
marijuana continues to be listed as a prohibited substance under federal law, a
growing number of states have permitted the medical use of marijuana or
decriminalized the recreational possession and use of marijuana, 77 signaling
shifting social attitudes towards—and commensurate legal treatment of—at
least this drug and perhaps drugs more generally.
B.

The Disease Model

At the time of Prohibition, the medical community was split as to
whether alcohol was a medical or moral issue. 78 Today, consistent with Rush’s
writings, addiction is largely understood to be a disease. 79
Alcohol and drugs impact the brain in three primary ways. First, they
“over-activate” the pleasure center or reward circuit of the brain, known as the

72. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (setting the mandatory minimum for powder cocaine
at 500 grams), with id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (setting the mandatory minimum for crack cocaine at 5
grams).
73. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2,373 (2010) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(B)(ii)–(iii)).
74. See generally Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166–72 (2016) (explaining the
history of alcohol laws and accidents in the United States to contextualize the three alcohol-related
accidents before the Court).
75. See infra notes 353–58 and accompanying text.
76. Amul Thapar, The Prescription Drug Epidemic: A Federal Judge’s Perspective, PARTNERSHIP
TO END ADDICTION (May 2011), https://drugfree.org/learn/drug-and-alcohol-news/the-prescription
-drug-epidemic-a-federal-judges-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/KSK2-6LAD].
77. See Natalie Fertig & Mona Zhang, 1 in 3 Americans Now Lives in a State Where Recreational
Marijuana Is Legal, POLITICO (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/04/1-in-3americans-lives-where-recreational-marijuana-legal-434004 [https://perma.cc/WRT3-NVDP].
78. Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 794 n.51 (2004)
(“[I]n a 1918 survey of health officials, 425 reported that physicians viewed addiction as a disease,
while 542 stated that addiction was instead viewed as a vice.”).
79. See Nora D. Volkow, George F. Koob & A. Thomas McLellan, Neurobiologic Advances from
the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363, 363 (2016) (“[N]euroscience
continues to support the brain disease model of addiction.”).
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basal ganglia. 80 Accordingly, an individual who drinks or uses may feel
enhanced euphoria in response to ingesting alcohol or drugs. 81 Despite the
euphoria or “buzz” generated by alcohol, it is “classified . . . as a depressant
because it later causes sedation and drowsiness.” 82 If heavily consumed,
“alcohol can induce unconsciousness, coma, and even death.” 83 Opiate
consumption produces a “surge of dopamine,” akin to “a tidal wave in the
reward circuits of the brain.” 84 A person on heroin recounts “feel[ing] like a
master of the universe, like you’re being ‘hugged by Jesus,’” as if “there’s peace
in your skin and not a single feeling of pain.” 85 Cocaine and
methamphetamine are examples of stimulants, though they differ in how they
produce stimulating effects: cocaine blocks dopamine from reabsorption,
keeping it in circulation, whereas methamphetamine increases dopamine
output. 86 A person who drinks or uses drugs may increasingly crave and desire
the substance due to these seemingly positive effects of the substance. 87 With
repeated use of the intoxicating substance, the individual develops a tolerance:
the brain becomes accustomed to the alcohol or drug, and thus the person
must introduce more of the alcohol or drug into their system to trigger the
desired pleasurable response. 88
Second, once the body processes the alcohol or drugs and pleasurable
feelings correspondingly fade, the extended amygdala—or stress-center of the
brain—becomes particularly sensitive and the individual experiences
symptoms associated with withdrawal, such as irritability and anxiety. 89 Thus,
an individual may seek out and ingest additional alcohol or drugs to reduce
these symptoms, as opposed to the original objective of consumption—namely
achieving or enhancing pleasure. 90 Ceasing use following prolonged periods of
use can generate acute symptoms of withdrawal. When an individual
“detoxes,” or stops using in order to detoxify and rid the body of the alcohol
80. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior-science-addiction/drugs-brain [https:
//perma.cc/FZ2D-7LU5] (last updated July 2018) [hereinafter Drugs, Brains, and Behavior].
81. Id.
82. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Information About Alcohol, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO.
(2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20360/ [https://perma.cc/SNW9-ZQ6P].
83. Id.
84. Shreeya Sinha, Heroin Addiction Explained: How Opioids Hijack the Brain, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/us/addiction-heroin-opioids.html [https://
perma.cc/B39P-A4L2 (dark archive)].
85. Id.
86. Methamphetamine Research Report, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Oct. 2019),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/methamphetamine/how-methamphetamine
-different-other-stimulants-such-cocaine [https://perma.cc/3BKF-59G5].
87. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 8080.
88. Id.
89. Id.80
90. Id.
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or drugs and their lingering physical effects, the individual’s bodily response
can be severe, including hallucinations, vomiting, and incontinence. 91 Third,
alcohol and drugs impact the prefrontal cortex, the decision-making center of
the brain. 92 A person’s judgment may be impaired, and inhibitions may be
lowered, while alcohol or drugs are in their system. 93
Alcohol and drugs affect other parts of the body, too. The specific
physical and psychological effects of intoxicating substances are not the same
for all such substances but depend on various factors, including interactions
with other drugs or medication, the amount of use, and the type of
substance. 94 Heroin, for example, attaches to the central nervous system and
leads to respiratory depression. 95 When an individual overdoses on heroin,
respiration slows and can fail altogether. 96 To combat the decrease in
respiration during an overdose, Naloxone can be administered (generally as a
nasal form called Narcan). 97 Naloxone can save the life of an individual
experiencing heroin overdose by blocking heroin’s receptors, thus diminishing
respiratory depression and restoring normal, automated breathing functions. 98
C.

Medical and Therapeutic Treatment

The disease model of addiction informs the prevailing view that
addiction itself is the product of multiple factors and can be treated. Heart

91. Id.; see also Julia O’Malley, Hooked, Part 3: Cravings Come at Night Taunting Her,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.adn.com/features/article/heroin-promisesrelief-daily-struggle/2010/06/22/ [https://perma.cc/HL4A-FWBY] (“It feels like the worst flu you’ve
ever had. Your body aches. Your skin hurts. You sweat. You puke. You can’t control your bowels.
Dread consumes you.”); Sinha, supra note 84 (“[Withdrawal] might [include] crippling pain,
vomiting, insomnia, spasms, hot and cold flashes, goosebumps, congestion and tears. All this on top
of debilitating anxiety and depression.”). In addition to immediate withdrawal, an individual who
ceases to use drugs or alcohol may experience prolonged withdrawal symptoms lasting up to two
years, referred to as Post-Acute Withdrawal Symptoms or PAWS. See Steven M. Melemis, Relapse
Prevention and the Five Rules of Recovery, 88 YALE J. BIO. MED. 325, 328 (2015) (describing the
symptoms of such post-acute withdrawal).
92. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80.
93. Id.
94. For a helpful chart on the precise effects that correspond with particular substances, see
generally NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
SUBSTANCE USE (2004), https://ncsacw.samhsa.gov/files/TrainingPackage/MOD2/Physicaland
PsychEffectsSubstanceUse.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHZ2-KNT2].
95. Caroline J. Jolley, James Bell, Gerrard F. Rafferty, John Moxham & John Strang,
Understanding Heroin Overdose: A Study of the Acute Respiratory Depressant Effects of Injected
Pharmaceutical Heroin, PLOS ONE, Oct. 23, 2015, at 10.
96. Id. at 2.
97. See Naloxone, SUBSTANCE ABUSE MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.
samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment/naloxone [https://perma.cc/PZ5U-OT6Y] (last
updated Aug. 19, 2020).
98. Id.
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disease, for example, has genetic, social, and other causes; 99 so too does
addiction. 100 Heart disease may be treated through medical and other means; 101
so too can addiction. 102
Addiction treatment responds to and is dependent upon the needs and
circumstances of the individual. 103 It may be helpful to consider treatment
options along a continuum. On the acute end of the spectrum, a person who
has used a substance in heavy amounts for an extended duration may need to
detox, during which the effects of withdrawal from immediate cessation can be
monitored in a hospital or inpatient setting, and/or managed through
medication. 104 Once the person is physically stable, they may be referred for
inpatient or outpatient treatment. 105 The former is more appropriate for an
individual who does not have a stable living situation (such as someone who
has been asked not to return to their house or who lives with others who
actively drink or use) or who requires a high level of care (for example,

99. See Edward P. Havranek, Mahasin S. Mujahid, Donald A. Barr, Irene V. Blair, Meryl S.
Cohen, Salvador Cruz-Flores, George Davey-Smith, Cheryl R. Dennison-Himmelfarb, Michael S.
Lauer, Debra W. Lockwood, Milagros Rosal & Clyde W. Yancy, Social Determinants of Risks and
Outcomes for Cardiovascular Disease: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association, 132
CIRCULATION 873, 888 (2015) (“[A]lthough we have traditionally considered CVD the consequence
of certain modifiable and nonmodifiable physiological, lifestyle, and genetic risk factors, we must now
broaden the focus to incorporate a third arm of risk, the social determinants of health.”).
100. See Substance Abuse: Life Stages & Determinants, OFF. OF DISEASE PREVENTION &
HEALTH PROMOTION,
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/leading-health-indicators/2020-lhitopics/Substance-Abuse/determinants [https://perma.cc/L252-LEYM] (listing several determinants
of substance abuse).
101. See NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., IN BRIEF: YOUR GUIDE TO LIVING WELL
WITH HEART DISEASE 1 (2006), https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/sites/default/files/publications/065716.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVN9-YWCD] (“Heart disease . . . can be treated in three ways: by
making heart healthy changes in your daily habits, by taking medication, and in some cases, by having
a medical procedure.”).
102. See What Is a Substance Abuse Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://
www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/addiction/what-is-addiction [https://perma.cc/T7TT-MSQ4]
(“Because [a Substance Abuse Disorder] affects many aspects of a person’s life, multiple types of
treatment are often required. . . . Medications are used to control drug cravings, relieve severe
symptoms of withdrawal, and prevent relapses. . . . Many people find mutual-aid groups helpful
(Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, SMART Recover) [as well as s]elf-help groups that
include family members (Al-Anon or Nar-Anon Family Groups).”).
103. See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TREATMENT APPROACHES FOR DRUG ADDICTION, 2
(2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/drugfacts-treatmentapproaches.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9296-BSZA] (“No single treatment is right for everyone. . . . Effective treatment addresses
all of the patient’s needs, not just his or her drug use. . . . Treatment plans must be reviewed often
and modified to fit the patient’s changing needs.”).
104. Id. (“Medications help suppress withdrawal symptoms during detoxification.”); see also Drug
and Alcohol Detox, ADDICTION CTR., https://www.addictioncenter.com/treatment/drug-and-alcoholdetox/ [https://perma.cc/D69M-PR59] (“Detoxification, or detox, is the process of letting the body
remove the drugs in it. The purpose of detox is to safely manage withdrawal symptoms when
someone stops taking drugs or alcohol.”).
105. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80103.
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someone who has been unable to improve in an outpatient environment). 106
Typically, both inpatient and outpatient treatment involve a combination of
individual therapy, group therapy, and medically assisted treatment
(“MAT”). 107 Individual therapy generally consists of the patient meeting with
a licensed counselor or therapist to discuss the reasons for use, triggers, and
other circumstances impacting the person’s inability to achieve and maintain
sobriety, and any related or co-occurring mental health issues, such as anxiety,
trauma, or depression, that may impact the person’s drinking or use. 108 Group
therapy generally consists of peer-based support facilitated or supervised by a
licensed counselor or therapist. 109 A group therapy session generally includes
three components: an initial check-in part in which participants share how
they are feeling or doing that day or since they were last in group; a part in
which participants further discuss issues raised by other participants, using “I”
statements as opposed to giving advice through “you” statements; and an
educational part in which participants learn about coping mechanisms (for
example, art therapy and meditation), forms of self-care, how the brain is
impacted by addiction, and so on. 110
MAT consists of the administration of appropriate medication for
addiction and any co-occurring mental health disorders. 111 An individual with
an addiction to alcohol, for example, may be given Antabuse (which can make
the individual physically ill if they ingest alcohol while on this medication and
106. See id. 103(“Impatient or residential treatment can also be very effective, especially for those
with more severe problems (including co-occurring disorders).”).
107. See Medications, Counseling, and Related Conditions, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment [https://
perma.cc/DS6W-85CZ] [hereinafter MAT Medications] (defining MAT as “the use of medications, in
combination with counseling and behavioral therapies, to provide a ‘whole-patient’ approach to the
treatment of substance use disorders”).
108. See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION
TREATMENT: A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 28 (3rd ed. 2018) [hereinafter Principles of Drug
Addiction], https://www.drugabuse.gov/download/675/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-researchbased-guide-third-edition.pdf?v=74dad603627bab89b93193918330c223
[https://perma.cc/2ZHN8T7S] (“Individualized drug counseling not only focuses on reducing or stopping illicit drug or
alcohol use; it also addresses related areas of impaired functioning . . . as well as the content and the
structure of the patient’s recovery program. Through its emphasis on short-term behavioral goals,
individualized counseling helps the patient develop coping strategies and tools to abstain from drug
use and maintain abstinence.”).
109. Id. (detailing how group therapy may “capitalize on the social reinforcement offered by peer
discussion and to help promote drug-free lifestyles”); see also CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT: GROUP THERAPY xv (2005) (discussing how “[i]n
the hands of a skilled, well-trained group leader, the potential healing powers inherent in a group can
be harnessed and directed to foster” positive outcomes).
110. See CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 109109109, at xvi–xvii
(describing the advantages of group therapy as including “positive peer support; a reduction in
clients’ sense of isolation; real-life examples of people in recovery; help from peers in coping with
substance abuse and other life problems; [and] information and feedback from peers”).
111. See MAT Medications, supra note 107.
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thus serves as a deterrent to drinking alcohol), 112 or Vivitrol (which blocks the
ability of the individual to experience euphoria from alcohol). 113 Aside from
the precise effect, the length of the effect also is an important distinction
between the two medications. Antabuse lasts in the body for several days and
Vivitrol for several weeks. 114 MAT, during detox and the post-detox phase,
also may include maintenance medications, such as suboxone, methadone, or
buprenorphine, which are prescribed opiates designed to minimize physical
dependence and the effects of acute withdrawal. 115
Inpatient and outpatient treatment typically lasts for one to two
months. 116 An overarching goal of such treatment is to put the individual in a
position to develop their own support structure that they will then be able to
rely upon when formal rehabilitation ends. 117 When an individual enters
treatment, they may be encouraged or expected to attend ninety twelve-step
meetings in ninety days (known as the “90 in 90”), based on the belief that it
takes ninety days for the brain to learn and develop a new habit, to ensure that
the individual develops their own independent support system. 118 During a
rehabilitation program, an individual also may be encouraged or expected to
obtain a sponsor, who is typically someone with extended “clean time” who
has completed or “worked” a twelve-step program and who can serve as a
mentor, guide, and advisor during the recovery process. 119 Once a
rehabilitation program is over, the participant may be encouraged to attend
twelve-step meetings, be actively meeting with their sponsor, and serve the
recovery community.

112. Using Disulfiram To Treat Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, AM. ADDICTION CTRS., https://
americanaddictioncenters.org/addiction-medications/disulfiram
[https://perma.cc/4G9T-MZTA]
(last updated June 19, 2019).
113. Overview of Vivitrol (Naltrexone), AM. ADDICTION CTRS., https://americanaddiction
centers.org/addiction-medications/vivitrol [https://perma.cc/KLR4-5ENK] (last updated Feb. 4,
2020).
114. Id.
115. See MAT Medications, supra note 107107; see also Sinha, supra note 84 (“[Buprenorphine,
methadone, and naltrexone] soften the cravings without causing euphoria.”).
116. See Matt Gonzales, How Long Does Rehab Take?, DRUGREHAB.COM, https://www.
drugrehab.com/treatment/how-long-does-rehab-take/ [https://perma.cc/DB5A-N9VS] (last updated
Feb. 26, 2020).
117. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 9 (“In addition to stopping drug abuse, the
goal of treatment is to return people to productive functioning in the family, workplace, and
community.”).
118. See 90 Meetings in 90 Days, LION ROCK RECOVERY, https://www.lionrockrecovery
.com/drug-and-alcohol-addiction-resources/advice/90-meetings-in-90-days [https://perma.cc/XJR4ZDA5].
119. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 28 (“Self-help groups can complement and
extend the effects of professional treatment.”); see also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ON SPONSORSHIP 13 (2019) (describing the vital role of a sponsor as doing
“everything possible . . . to help the newcomer get sober and stay sober through the A.A. program”).
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Twelve-step meetings, such as Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) and
Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”), offer the individual a practical blueprint for
recovery, beginning with a desire to be sober and an acknowledgment that the
individual is incapable of achieving and maintaining sobriety on their own. 120
Both AA and NA tout recovery through fellowship, and the organization and
meetings themselves espouse equality and volunteerism and lack any rigid
hierarchy. 121 Twelve-step meetings are not monolithic: some involve a single
person providing opening comments (a “lead”) that may contain a theme or
question that other individuals can, but need not, address during their
comments (or “share”); some involve speakers, much like a lecture about one’s
journey from active addiction to recovery; and still others may involve reading
from and commenting on AA or NA literature. 122 In addition to AA or NA,
there are other fellowship meetings, such as SMART Recovery (which may be
distinguished from AA and NA in that these meetings do not include any
element of a higher power and also permit cross-talk), 123 Celebrate Recovery
(which bills itself as a “Christ-centered 12-step program”), 124 and Refuge
Recovery (a spiritual or mindfulness-based approach based principally on a
book by Noah Levine). 125
Benjamin Rush, who helped pioneer the disease model of addiction,
suggested that an individual with drug or alcohol disease abstain completely
from these substances. 126 Abstinence remains, for some, a core component of
120. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THE TWELVE STEPS AND THE TWELVE TRADITIONS 21
(77th ed. 2012) (“We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become
unmanageable.”); NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, INSTITUTIONAL GROUP GUIDE, TWELVE STEPS OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS 2 (1998) (“We admitted that we were powerless over our addiction, that
our lives had become unmanageable.”).
121. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, DAILY REFLECTIONS, at Feb. 8 (1990) [hereinafter
DAILY REFLECTIONS] (“Regular attendance at meetings, serving and helping others is the
recipe that many have tried and found to be successful.”); ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, A.A. FACT
FILE 4 (2018) [hereinafter A.A. FACT FILE], https://www.aa.org/assets/en_US/m-24_aafactfile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BR6A-Y839] (“Alcoholics Anonymous is not organized in the formal or political
sense. There are no governing officers, no rules or regulations, no fees or dues.”).
122. See Buddy T, Going to Your First 12-Step Meeting, VERYWELL MIND, https://www.
verywellmind.com/what-can-i-expect-at-a-12-step-meeting-63409 [https://perma.cc/Y8WD-NBGC]
(last updated May 22, 2020) (“Different meetings have different ways of doing things . . . . In some
meetings, people are randomly called on . . . . In other meetings, at the end of the prayer, everyone
may say a popular AA slogan . . . .”).
123. See SMART Recovery Meetings Cross 2,000 Mark, Including 1,000 in U.S., SMART
RECOVERY (Mar. 28, 2016), https://smartrecovery.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2000thMeeting
.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9ET-N7XM].
124. See CELEBRATE RECOVERY, https://www.celebraterecovery.com [https://perma.cc/ZAG8NXW3].
125. NOAH LEVINE, REFUGE RECOVERY: A BUDDHIST PATH TO RECOVERING FROM
ADDICTION (2014).
126. BENJAMIN RUSH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ARDENT SPIRITS UPON THE
HUMAN BODY AND MIND 36 (8th ed. 1823) (“[M]y observations authorize me to say; that persons
who have been addicted to them, should abstain from them suddenly and entirely. ‘Taste not, handle
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addiction treatment and recovery. 127 Twelve-step programs also subscribe to
the proposition that an individual who seeks to address addiction must abstain
from not only the drug of choice but from all other drugs as well. 128 A person
with an addiction to alcohol, therefore, would not be permitted to ingest
marijuana or another drug. The use of medications that may be habit-forming
also would be counseled against under an abstinence model.
A growing alternative to the abstinence model is the harm-reduction
model, typified by safe injection sites in which an individual with substance
use disorder is offered “medically supervised consumption and observation
rooms” and is encouraged to enter treatment. 129 The federal government has
argued, and the Third Circuit recently agreed, that these safe consumption
sites are inconsistent with federal law. 130 Nonetheless, these sites do have the
support of some members of the medical community, including the American
Medical Association. 131
The threshold consideration of whether an individual has an addiction to
alcohol or drugs takes the form of an intake assessment conducted by a
licensed counselor or therapist. 132 The leading reference guide for clinical
addiction professionals is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM-V”), published by the American Psychiatric Association. 133
The DSM-V categorizes substance abuse and alcohol abuse as “disorders.” 134
The DSM-V suggests a holistic assessment of whether an individual possesses
either disorder, listing eleven factors (for example, “unsuccessful efforts” to
not, touch not,’ should be inscribed upon every vessel that contains spirits in the house of a man, who
wishes to be cured of habits of intemperance.”).
127. See A.A. FACT FILE, supra note 121, at 9120; NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 120.
128. See A.A. FACT FILE, supra note 121, at 9; NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 120.
129. United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 586 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
130. See Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, United States v. Safehouse, 2020 WL 906997
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-0519), 2020 WL 562321, at *2 (calling the “‘safe’ injection site” a
“radical public health experiment” that “violates the plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2), which
makes it a crime to manage or control any place and ‘knowingly and intentionally’ make the place
available for unlawfully using a controlled substance”); United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 243
(3d Cir. 2021) (holding that the consumption rooms were unlawful).
131. See Press Release, AMA Wants New Approaches To Combat Synthetic and Injectable Drugs, AM.
MED. ASS’N (June 12, 2017), http://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-wants-newapproaches-combat-synthetic-and-injectable-drugs [https://perma.cc/FTY8-58QQ] (“[T]he AMA
today voted to support the development of pilot facilities where people who use intravenous drugs
can inject self-provided drugs under medical supervision.”).
132. For a list of validated assessments, see Screening and Assessment Tools Chart, NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE (June 22, 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/nidamed-medical-health-professionals/
screening-tools-resources/chart-screening-tools [https://perma.cc/XY9Z-YRYP].
133. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
134. Id. at xlii (“The categories of substance abuse and substance dependence have been
eliminated and replaced with an overarching new category of substance use disorders—with the
specific substance used defining the specific disorders.”).
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curb consumption and “tolerance”) to guide that assessment. 135 An individual
must manifest at least two factors in a twelve-month period to qualify for
substance use disorder. 136 An individual with a mild presentation of the
disorder will possess two or three factors in that span, moderate four to five,
and severe at least six. 137 Individuals with an addiction may not all drink or
use in the same way: one need not drink or use daily or alone to qualify. One
who goes on periodic binges in public, for example, can be an individual with
an alcohol or substance use disorder, as may someone who drinks or uses every
day. 138
Despite the increased sense that addiction is a disease and not a moral
failing, the social stigma associated with addiction persists. 139 This social
135. The eleven diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder are:
1.

Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended.

2.

There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol use.

3. A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain alcohol, use alcohol, or
recover from its effects.
4.

Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol.

5. Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work,
school, or home.
6. Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal
problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of alcohol.
7. Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because
of alcohol use.
8.

Recurrent alcohol use in situations in which it is physically hazardous.

9. Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical
or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by alcohol.
10. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following: a. A need for markedly increased
amounts of alcohol to achieve intoxication or desired effect. b. A markedly diminished effect
with continued use of the same amount of alcohol.
11. Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following: a. The characteristic withdrawal
syndrome or alcohol . . . . b. Alcohol (or a closely related substance, such as a
benzodiazepine) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms.
Id. at 490–91. The diagnostic criteria for other substances are generally the same diagnostic criteria
used for alcohol use disorder with only small variations. See id. at 509–10 (cannabis use disorder); id.
at 520 (phencyclidine use disorder); id. at 533–34 (inhalant use disorder); id. at 541 (opioid use
disorder); id. at 550–51 (sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic use disorder); id. at 561 (stimulant use
disorder—including cocaine).
136. Id. at 490.
137. Id. at 484. AA and NA similarly pose a series of questions to help the individual determine
whether they may have a problem.
138. See Researchers Identify Alcoholism Subtypes, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM (June 28, 2007), https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/researchersidentify-alcoholism-subtypes [https://perma.cc/R85T-CTQL]; Bankole A. Johnson, Medication
Treatment of Different Types of Alcoholism, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 630, 630 (2010).
139. See, e.g., Stephanie Desmon & Susan Morrow, Drug Addiction Viewed More Negatively Than
Mental Illness, Johns Hopkins Study Shows, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://hub.jhu.edu/
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stigma has existed from the founding of our nation. Those who sought to boot
a federal judge from office charged as a reason for impeachment that he had
“bad moral character due to drunkenness.” 140 (Today, a federal judge whose
drinking is a concern would be referred to a committee within Article III
governing judicial disability). 141 In the twentieth century, members of the
Supreme Court acknowledged the “harsh moral attitude which our society has
traditionally taken toward intoxication and the shame which we have
associated with alcoholism,” further observing that “Anglo-American society
has long condemned [alcoholism] as a moral defect” and “cultural taboo.” 142
Unfavorable public perceptions of individuals with drug or alcohol diseases are
easy to find among the public, 143 in popular culture, 144 and even among
physicians. 145 Stigma contributes to individuals with drug or alcohol diseases

2014/10/01/drug-addiction-stigma/ [https://perma.cc/KHT8-BSQ2] (summarizing a study in which
respondents reported disinterest in working with a person with an addiction and noting that
respondents continue to believe that addiction is a moral failing).
140. MAVEETY, supra note 26, at 12.
141. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364.
142. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968).
143. See, e.g., K.M. Keyes, M.L. Hatzenbuehler, K.A. McLaughlin, B. Link, M. Offoson, B.F.
Grant & D. Hasin, Stigma and Treatment for Alcohol Disorders in the United States, 172 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1364, 1365 (2010) (“Alcohol disorders are among the most highly stigmatized of the
psychiatric disorders. For example, public perceptions of individuals with alcohol disorders include
negative labels, such as dangerous, immoral, and blameworthy.”); Georg Schomerus, Michael Lucht,
Anita Holzinger, Herbert Matschinger, Mauro G. Carta & Matthias C. Angermeyer, The Stigma of
Alcohol Dependence Compared with Other Mental Disorders: A Review of Population Studies, 46 ALCOHOL
& ALCOHOLISM 105, 105 (2011) (describing the negative consequences of alcohol dependence and
noting that “[t]he stigma of alcoholism is likely to aggravate these effects; it may hinder the seeking
of professional and lay help, because people fear being labelled alcoholics and subsequently
experiencing loss of status and discrimination”); Georg Schomerus, The Stigma of Alcohol and Other
Substance Abuse, in THE STIGMA OF DISEASE AND DISABILITY: UNDERSTANDING CAUSES AND
OVERCOMING INJUSTICES 57, 57–58 (Patrick W. Corrigan ed., 2014).
144. In Breaking Bad, for example, Walter White calls his former student Jesse Pinkman a
“pathetic junkie,” adding, “You are just a drug addict.” Breaking Bad: Down (AMC television
broadcast Mar. 29, 2009). Likewise, in The Wire, D’Angelo Barksdale, a mid-level player in a drug
distribution ring, calls out his subordinates for their dismissive attitude towards a customer who is
looking for heroin. Barksdale protests their treating “him like a dog,” arguing, “You ain’t gotta punk
em like that.” The Wire: The Buys (HBO television broadcast June 16, 2002). The street-level dealers
justify their attitude by suggesting the individual with drug or alcohol disease deserves or invites such
treatment: “He punked hisself. [sic] He a goddamn addict,” emphasizing again, “they [just] dope
fiends.” Id.
145. See Schomerus et al., supra note 143, at 59; Leonieke C. van Boekel, Evelien P.M. Brouwers,
Jaap van Weeghel & Henk F.L. Garretsen, Stigma Among Health Professionals Towards Patients with
Substance Use Disorders and Its Consequences for Healthcare Delivery: Systemic Review, 131 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 23, 24 (2013); Cecelia Kathleen Mendiola, Giorgio Galetto & Michael
Fingerhood, An Exploration of Emergency Physicians’ Attitudes Towards Patients with Substance Use
Disorder, 12 J. ADDICTION MED. 132, 132 (2018).
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internalizing these negative attitudes and experiencing shame, embarrassment,
and similar feelings, and in turn not coming forward to seek help. 146
While the disease model is prevalent, it is not without criticism. A
leading objection to the disease model points to research indicating that some
individuals who seemed at one time to be addicted to alcohol or drugs are
able, without treatment, to resume consumption of their drug of choice
without exhibiting the adverse consequences suggesting an addiction. 147 In an
oft-quoted study, approximately fifteen to twenty percent of American
soldiers who served in the Vietnam War were addicted to heroin, but of those
who returned home, only five percent exhibited an addiction within the
following year and only twelve percent relapsed within three years. 148 This
transformation apparently occurred “overnight” and “spontaneously,” without
the aid of formal rehabilitation. 149
Another major criticism of the disease model derives from its insistence
that the individual with drug or alcohol disease abstain from alcohol or drugs.
This insistence is predicated on the proposition that an individual with drug
or alcohol disease cannot ingest any healthy amount of alcohol or drugs.
Studies on controlled drinking suggest, however, that certain individuals with
addiction may be able to ingest alcohol without giving rise to the negative
factors that indicate an addiction to alcohol. 150 To be fair, according to this
research, only some are able to return to drinking that is not problematic; the
more one is dependent on alcohol, the less likely that such a return is
possible. 151 The ability of some to safely return to alcohol cuts against, for
critics, the disease model’s categorical insistence on abstinence.
*

*

*

This part explained the historical, physiological, and corrective
components of addiction. This descriptive overview established a factual
foundation for the next part on how the law has addressed addiction.

146. See Gail D’Onfrio, Fight the Opioid Epidemic with Stigma-Free Treatment, CATO UNBOUND
(Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2019/08/21/gail-donofrio/fight-opioid-epidemicstigma-free-treatment [https://perma.cc/E2WP-U4P9].
147. See Nick Heather, Is the Concept of Compulsion Useful in the Explanation or Description of
Addictive Behavior and Experience?, 6 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. REPS. 15, 27–28 (2017); Lee N. Robins,
Vietnam Veterans’ Rapid Recovery from Heroin Addiction: A Fluke or Normal Expectation?, 88
ADDICTION 1041, 1053 (1993).
148. JAMES CLEAR, ATOMIC HABITS: AN EASY & PROVEN WAY TO BUILD GOOD HABITS &
BREAK BAD ONES 91 (2018).
149. Id. at 92.
150. See William R. Miller, Controlled Drinking: A History and a Critical Review, 44 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 68, 78–79 (1983).
151. See Alcohol Abstinence vs. Moderation, HARV. MED. SCH. (Jan. 2009), http://www.health
.harvard.edu/mind-and-mood/alcohol-abstinence-vs-moderation [https://perma.cc/YG48-JH6G].
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II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADDICTION
This part describes how the courts have translated matters of addiction
into legal concepts and rules. It first briefly sketches the relationship of
addiction with four common criminal law concepts: voluntary intoxication,
involuntary intoxication, temporary insanity, and fixed insanity. It then
provides a detailed summary of the two Supreme Court cases—Robinson and
Powell—on the criminal responsibility of individuals with an addiction to
drugs or alcohol. Lastly, it summarizes the two legal models that have
emerged from these two seminal cases.
A.

Intoxication and Insanity

This section summarizes the primary and varied methods by which issues
related to addiction have been introduced in criminal theory and litigation. A
manifestation of addiction is intoxication, or heavy consumption that leads to
impaired judgment, impaired motor functioning, and loss of inhibitions. 152
Circumstances in which intoxication and criminal law may intersect are easy
to conceptualize. A criminal defendant may claim, for example, that criminal
liability is not appropriate because they were intoxicated and the incident was
completely out of character.
Voluntary Intoxication. In considering this line of argument, courts will
probe whether the ingestion of the alcohol or drug producing the alleged state
of intoxication was voluntary or involuntary. “Voluntary intoxication” occurs
when an individual ingests a substance known by the individual to possess
intoxicating properties. 153 The individual need not know the precise type or
brand of substance for the ingestion to be voluntary; all that is required, other
than the act of knowing ingestion, is knowledge that what the individual is
putting into their system is of an intoxicating quality. 154 A person who goes to
a party, drinks what they know to be alcohol, and becomes intoxicated from

152. The medical basis for these effects is discussed supra in Section I.B.
153. State v. Champagne, 447 P.3d 297, 317 (Ariz. 2019) (citing State v. Payne, 314 P.3d 1239,
1272–73 (Ariz. 2013)).
154. See Cribb v. State, 45 S.E. 396, 397 (Ga. 1903) (“There was no evidence on which to charge
as to the effect of drugging the ale alleged to have been used by the defendant, nor can the courts
establish a precedent which would authorize a chemical investigation as to whether the liquor was
good or bad, pure or impure, drugged, or containing only malt, spirituous, or vinous qualities.
Drunkenness voluntarily produced by one sort of liquor is no more an excuse for crime than that
caused by any other kind of intoxicating drink.”); State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 457, 196 S.E.2d 777,
786 (1973) (“‘[I]nvoluntary intoxication is a very rare thing, and can never exist when the person
intoxicated knows what he is drinking, and drinks the intoxicant voluntarily, and without being made
to do so by force or coercion.’ . . . Thus it is only when alcohol has been induced into a person’s
system without his knowledge or by force majeure that his intoxication will be regarded as
involuntary.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Perryman v. State, 159 P. 937–38
(Okla. 1916)).
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having several such drinks has become voluntarily intoxicated, despite the fact
that they intended to drink without reaching a state of intoxication.
At common law, voluntary intoxication, where the ingestion was
attributed to the free will of the defendant, did not excuse or otherwise
diminish an individual’s exposure to criminal liability. 155 Lord Hale, for
example, wrote that he who became voluntarily intoxicated “shall have no
privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same
judgment as if he were in his right senses.” 156 If anything, at common law,
voluntary intoxication was deemed to be an aggravating factor in liability
assessments. For example, Sir William Blackstone described voluntary
intoxication “as an aggravation of the offence, rather than as an excuse for any
criminal misbehaviour.” 157 Early American jurisprudence is consistent with
this strict common law approach to voluntary intoxication. Justice Story,
reflecting both the common law tradition and the general social aversion to
the intoxicated individual, asserted that “[d]runkenness is a gross vice, and in
the contemplation of some of our laws is a crime; and I learned in my earlier
studies, that so far from its being in law an excuse for murder, it is rather an
aggravation of its malignity.” 158
In modern criminal cases, a prosecutor may rely on voluntary
intoxication to help prove that the defendant had diminished inhibitions and
thus was more capable of committing the act in question. 159 The prosecution
also may point to the relevant behavior of the defendant to demonstrate
capability and intent (such as, retrieving a weapon from a vehicle, or taking
aim and shooting the victim in the head), to blunt the relevance of the
intoxicated state of the defendant. 160 The defense generally will be unable to
155. See Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1944)
(“The early common law apparently made no concession whatever because of intoxication . . . .”).
156. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 44 (1996) (quoting 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN *32–*33); accord Reniger v. Fogossa [1816] 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 31 (KB) (“[I]f a person that is
drunk kills another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it, and yet he did it through
ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no understanding nor memory; but inasmuch as that
ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be
privileged thereby.”).
157. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 44 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25–*26).
158. United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 657–58 (C.C. R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868).
159. See State v. Payette, 38 A.3d 1120, 1127 (R.I. 2012) (“A claim of diminished capacity will
negate the specific intent charged only if the intoxication is found to be ‘of such a degree as to
completely paralyze the will of the [defendant], take from him the power to withstand evil
impulses[,] and render his mind incapable of forming any sane design.’” (alteration in original)
(emphasis added)).
160. See, e.g., Lewellyn v. State, 523 N.E.2d 768, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that
voluntary intoxication did not render defendant incapable of forming necessary intent to commit
crime, as evidenced by the fact that the “[defendant] threatened to shoot [the victim]. Then [the
defendant] walked to a gun cabinet, removed a pump shotgun, pumped the gun, turned and shot [the
victim] in the chest”).
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use voluntary intoxication to negate criminal responsibility because of the
principle that the intoxication can be traced to the individual’s free will. But
the defense may challenge whether the defendant was capable of carrying out
the crime due to an intoxicated state (for example, if the defendant was passed
out) 161 or whether the defendant possessed the mental state required under the
statute (in other words, whether the defendant intended to commit the act). 162
Involuntary Intoxication. In contrast to voluntary intoxication,
“involuntary intoxication” generally occurs when the ingestion of a substance
with intoxicating properties, or that produces an unexpected intoxicating
effect, is not the product of the individual’s free will. 163 In general, involuntary
intoxication occurs in one of two circumstances: First, when the
involuntariness is attributable to a third party, such as a person who compels
or tricks the individual into ingesting an intoxicant 164 or a medical professional
who prescribes a substance with an unforeseeable intoxicating effect. 165
Second, when the involuntariness is attributable to the individual ingesting
the intoxicant, such as an individual who accidentally ingests a substance with
an unforeseeable intoxicating effect 166 or an individual who knowingly ingests
a substance that produces an abnormal or unexpected reaction of
intoxication. 167 At both common law and at present, involuntary intoxication
negates criminal liability. 168

161. See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Prosecution of Chronic Alcoholic for Drunkenness Offenses, 40
A.L.R.3d 321 (1971) (first citing Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); then citing Easter
v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); then citing State v. Fearon, 166 N.W.2d 720
(Minn. 1969); and then citing City of Seattle v. Hill, 435 P.2d 692 (Wash. 1967)).
162. See generally R.W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Voluntary
Intoxication as Defense to Criminal Charge, 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1966) (discussing cases where the
defendant argued their alcoholism prevented the defendant from having the requisite intent to
commit the crime).
163. See Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1236 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Involuntary intoxication
results from fraud, trickery or duress of another, accident or mistake on defendant’s part, pathological
condition, or ignorance as to the effect of prescribed medication.”).
164. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary so as To Constitute
a Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 195 (1976) (first citing United States v. Jewett, 438 F.2d
495 (8th Cir. 1971); then citing Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029 (Ariz. 1931); then citing People v.
White, 264 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); and then citing People v. Scott, 194 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983)).
165. See id. (first citing Perkins v. United States, 228 F. 408 (4th Cir. 1915); then citing Johnson
v. State, 24 So. 2d 228 (Ala. Ct. App. 1945); then citing Boswell v. State, 610 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); and then citing Saldiveri v. State, 143 A.2d 70 (Md. 1958)).
166. See id. (first citing State v. Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1999); then citing People v.
Penman, 110 N.E. 894 (Ill. 1915); and then citing Dubs v. State, 235 A.2d 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1967)).
167. See id. (first citing Commonwealth v. Walker, 129 A. 453 (Pa. 1925); then citing People v.
Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987); then citing Hurley v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1970);
and then citing Sluyter v. State, 941 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
168. See id.
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While an individual who initially ingests a substance that produces
unexpected or unanticipated adverse intoxicating effects may not be
considered culpable, any continued use with knowledge of those adverse
effects may not protect the individual from the ordinary operation or
application of culpability principles. 169 This rule is consistent with tort law.
For example, a driver who suffers an unforeseeable medical incident and
crashes into another may escape civil liability, but if the driver subsequently
engages in the same behavior, they would have a more difficult time claiming
a lack of knowledge, culpability, and responsibility. 170 Consider the example of
an individual who has had fainting spells and crashes a car while unconscious
or asleep. The individual’s knowledge of the condition that produced the loss
of consciousness “is enough to make him guilty of a crime.” 171
Insanity. Insanity is another vehicle by which intoxication and addiction
are raised in the criminal context. In general, insanity concerns whether the
individual can appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. 172 Temporary
insanity speaks to a short-term inability, attributed to the ingestion of alcohol
or drugs, to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions. 173 Whether
temporary insanity may serve as a viable defense depends, as with voluntary
and involuntary intoxication, on whether the temporary insanity was brought
on by voluntary or involuntary conduct. 174

169. See id. (first citing Montero v. State, 996 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); and then
citing People v. Mahle, 78 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)).
170. See Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Liability for Automobile Accident Allegedly Caused by
Driver’s Blackout, Sudden Unconsciousness, or the Like, 93 A.L.R.3d 326 (1979). But see Hassman, supra
note 164 (explaining that an alcoholic drinking alcohol has been considered an involuntary act in a
number of cases even if the defendant knowingly consumes the alcohol).
171. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1(c) (3d ed. 2018).
172. See United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In a case where the
defendant asserts the affirmative defense of insanity, the ultimate issue is whether at the time of the
crime the defendant ‘appreciated the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.’”); United
States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The prosecution conceded Ewing suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia but argued he was not legally insane because he was able to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions.”).
173. See Phillip E. Hassman, Effect of Voluntary Drug Intoxication upon Criminal Responsibility, 73
A.L.R.3d 98 (1976) (describing that “[u]nderlying most attempts to gain recognition of voluntary
drug intoxication as a defense to a criminal act is some form of an insanity defense; but it is a
temporary insanity, a mental state that disappears when the effects of the drug wear off”).
174. See United States v. F.D.L., 836 F.2d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that, under an
insanity defense, as with involuntary intoxication, “[t]he defendant is excused from criminality
because intoxication affects the ability to distinguish between right and wrong”); id. at 1117
(“Congress in recently revising the Insanity defense statute specifically rejected voluntary
intoxication as a defense even if it renders the defendant unable to appreciate the nature and quality
of his acts.”); see also Martin v. Scroggy, No. 86-6212, 1987 WL 38721, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1987)
(rejecting defendant’s proposed temporary insanity defense resulting from an abnormal reaction to
alcohol).
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Fixed Insanity. A defendant may seek to avoid criminal liability by
invoking the doctrine of fixed or settled insanity. Under this doctrine,
continued intoxication has produced or contributed to a permanent inability of
the individual to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct. 175 Such a
defense was recognized in early nineteenth-century English law, as reported
by Lord Hale. 176 The concept found its way into American judicial opinions
shortly thereafter. 177 As with insanity stemming from involuntary intoxication,
settled insanity is a viable defense to criminal liability. Justice Story explains:
“[I]nsanity, whose remote cause is habitual drunkenness, is, or is not, an
excuse . . . for a [crime] committed by the party while so insane, but not at the
time intoxicated, or under the influence of liquor. . . . [I]nsanity is an excuse
for the commission of every crime.” 178 That said, the settled insanity defense
seems to be a narrow one, limited to those circumstances in which the
individual is in a perpetual state of inability to appreciate or regulate his

175. See Greider v. Duckworth, 701 F.2d 1228, 1233 (7th Cir. 1983) (“While temporary mental
incapacity induced by voluntary intoxication is generally not a defense, the law will not hold an
accused responsible for his acts where the ingestion of intoxicants has been abused to the point that it
has produced mental disease such that the accused is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”).
176. See Parker v. State, 254 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (“Hale, as the law does
today, distinguished between temporary insanity caused by voluntary drunkenness and that caused by
involuntary drunkenness and he recognized that permanent insanity, even though caused by
voluntary drinking excused the commission of a crime. The rule of law with respect to responsibility
for criminal conduct as affected by voluntary intoxication which has been consistently followed by
the majority of courts in the United States is substantially that stated by Lord Hale.”).
177. See, e.g., Springer v. Collins, 586 F.2d 329, 333–34 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Parker, 254 A.2d
at 388); Jones v. Stephens, 157 F. Supp. 3d 623, 661 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (citing Evers v. State, 20
S.W. 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1892)); Bieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811, 815–16 (Colo. 1993).
178. United States v. Drew, 25 Fed. Cas. 913, 913 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 14,993). A
California court offers this helpful language:
If [individual reason] is perverted or destroyed by fixed disease, though brought on by his
own vices, the law holds him not accountable, but if, by a voluntary act, he temporarily casts
off the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done him if he is considered
answerable for any injury which, in that state, he may do to others or to society . . . It must
be “settled insanity”, and not merely a temporary mental condition . . . which will relieve
one of the responsibility of his criminal act.
Bieber, 856 P.2d at 815 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Lim Dum Dong, 78 P.2d 1026, 1028
(Cal. Ct. App. 1938); see also Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 872 (1871) (“If
permanent insanity be produced by habitual drunkenness, then, like any other insanity, it excuses an
act which would be otherwise criminal.”).
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conduct. 179 Possessing an addiction, by itself, will not suffice to demonstrate
such insanity. 180
B.

Supreme Court Guideposts

The Supreme Court has handed down two cases—Robinson and Powell—
on criminal law and addiction. This section summarizes these two seminal
cases.
1. Robinson
On a street in Los Angeles, an officer noticed an individual whose arm
had significant needle marks and scabs, consistent with repeated injection of
narcotics from hypodermic needles. 181 The officer arrested the individual,
Lawrence Robinson, for violating a state statute making it a misdemeanor for
any person to be “addicted to the use of narcotics.” 182 Robinson was not under
the influence of narcotics at the time nor was he suffering from any
withdrawal symptoms. 183 But he admitted to using narcotics in the past. 184 At
the police station, another officer observed similar markings on Robinson’s
arms. 185
A jury convicted Robinson, and an appeals court affirmed. 186 But in 1962,
the Supreme Court reversed. 187 The Court expressed concern that the statute
did not purport to cover any action (such as instant drug use or any antisocial
conduct stemming from such use) nor did the statute refer the individual for
medical treatment. 188 Even if the statute criminalized conduct, “involuntary
confinement” for purposes of treatment could be appropriate, the Court
noted. 189 Here, however, treatment was not ordered; 190 instead, a violation of
the statute carried a sentence of between ninety days and one year in county
179. See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 165, 194 (2006) (“[E]xcept in such rare cases, most addicts’ rational intervals are probably
sufficiently rational to hold them largely or fully responsible for diminishing their own rationality at
the time of use or other drug-related crimes.”).
180. See United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the insanity
defense is not required as a matter of law when defendant only referenced addiction); United States
v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that the insanity defense is not required as a
matter of law when “testimony . . . does no more than express the idea that a narcotics addict may be
influenced by his appetite for drugs to commit a crime to support his habit”).
181. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S 660, 661 (1962).
182. Id. at 660.
183. Id. at 662.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 661.
186. Id. at 663–64.
187. Id. at 668.
188. Id. at 666.
189. Id. at 665.
190. Id.
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jail, with the possibility of probation of no more than five years. 191 The Court
also acknowledged that “addiction is an illness,” one that “may be contracted
innocently or involuntarily,” such as through “medically prescribed narcotics”
or a mother’s use during pregnancy. 192 With this understanding, the Court
held that the statutory provision amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Douglas, known incidentally to be a heavy drinker, 193 concurred.
He agreed that addiction is considered to be a “chronic disease” and a “mental
or psychiatric disorder.” 194 He suggested that punishing the individual with
drug or alcohol disease in the hopes that they will “forsake their evil ways” is
as foolish as punishing the insane as a method of reform or deterrence. 195
Indeed, Justice Douglas, citing a Senate Report, observed that “there is ‘a hard
core’ of ‘chronic and incurable drug addicts who, in reality, have lost their
power of self-control.’” 196 As “[t]he addict is a sick person,” he surmised, the
individual should be treated and may be confined for purposes of treatment. 197
Accordingly, it is cruel and unusual for a statute to “penaliz[e] an illness.” 198
Justice Harlan concurred as well, writing that “on the present state of
medical knowledge,” California could “conclude that narcotics addiction is
something other than an illness . . . .” 199 In this case, however, Robinson was
punished without committing any act and, instead, simply for being an
individual with an addiction to narcotics in California. 200
Justice Clark dissented, arguing that the statute does not reach “a person
who acted without volition or who had lost the power of self-control,” 201 but
rather “applies to the incipient narcotic addict who retains self-control . . . .” 202
As to the application of the statute to the person who lacks self-control, Justice
Clark noted that criminal law extends to status offenses, such as “drunkenness,
which plainly is as involuntary after addiction to alcohol as is the taking of
drugs.” 203 The statute, according to Justice Clark, is justified by the legitimate
goal of incapacitation as it seeks “to cure . . . by preventing further use.” 204
191. Id. at 660–61 n.1.
192. Id. at 667.
193. See Posner, supra note 26.
194. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 672, 675 (Douglas, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 669–70, 674.
196. Id. at 673.
197. Id. at 674.
198. Id. at 678.
199. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 680 (Clark, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 681; see also id. at 684 (“The section at issue applies only to persons who use narcotics
often or even daily but not to the point of losing self-control.”).
203. Id. at 684.
204. Id. at 681.
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Justice Clark contended that addiction is “a condition commonly recognized as
a threat to the State and to the individual” 205 and that California legitimately
“may attempt to deter and prevent . . . the grave threat of future harmful
conduct” arising from addiction. 206 Finally, Justice Clark pointed out that the
defense did not dispute that Robinson’s addiction may be traced to his own
actions. 207
Justice White also dissented, asserting that the statute was directed
toward conduct, specifically “the regular, repeated or habitual use of
narcotics.” 208 But, critically, Justice White suggested that he may have voted
differently if there was an indication that drug use was beyond Robinson’s
control. 209 “[I]f [Robinson] was convicted for being an addict who had lost his
power of self-control,” Justice White hypothesized, “I would have other
thoughts about this case.” 210 The Supreme Court would address the subject of
addiction and voluntariness only six years later.
2. Powell
Leroy Powell, a shoe shiner from Texas, drank wine daily and got drunk
about once a week. 211 When inebriated, Powell usually passed out in public. 212
He had been arrested approximately 100 times for public intoxication. 213 In
late December 1966, Powell was arrested again for public intoxication. 214
At trial, Powell claimed that he was “afflicted with the disease of chronic
alcoholism,” that being drunk in public was “not of his own volition,” and
that, as a result, “to punish him criminally for that conduct” would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. 215 In support of this contention, a psychiatrist
testified that a “‘chronic alcoholic’ is an ‘involuntary drinker,’ who is
‘powerless not to drink,’ and who ‘loses his self-control over his drinking.’” 216
Upon examining Powell, the psychiatrist concluded that Powell was a “chronic
alcoholic” who, once intoxicated, “is not able to control his behavior” and who
“reache[s] this point because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink.” 217
That said, the psychiatrist acknowledged that, while sober, Powell could
differentiate between right and wrong and that Powell’s decision to take the
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 679.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 686 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 555 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 517 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 518.
Id.
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first drink was a “voluntary exercise of his will.” 218 Despite his drinking
history and related criminal record, Powell never received treatment. 219
The morning of trial, Powell admitted to having a single drink before the
proceedings started. 220 The prosecution suggested that Powell’s ability to
refrain from having any additional drinks demonstrated that Powell could
exercise sufficient willpower to not become intoxicated. 221 The defense
countered with the theory that Powell had only one drink because he only had
enough money—he only made about $12 a week—for that one drink. 222
The trial court found that “chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys
the afflicted person’s will power to resist the constant, excessive consumption
of alcohol,” that “a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own
volition,” and that Powell “is a chronic alcoholic who is afflicted with the
disease of chronic alcoholism.” 223 But the trial court ruled, as a matter of law,
that chronic alcoholism was not a defense to the charge. 224 The trial court
therefore upheld the conviction. 225
If Robinson forbids states from punishing status, the Supreme Court in
Powell addressed the question left open by Robinson, namely whether conduct
that is symptomatic of addiction may not be punished either, “because it is, in
some sense, ‘involuntary’ . . . .” 226 In an opinion authored by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, a plurality of four Justices of the Supreme Court recognized the
“widespread agreement today that ‘alcoholism’ is a ‘disease . . . .’” 227 There was
no consensus, however, as to what this medical determination meant for legal
purposes, the plurality acknowledged. 228 Compounding the uncertainty, the
plurality noted, were the different types of individuals with alcoholism and
different manifestations of problem drinking. 229 Citing the work of leading
disease-model scholar E. Morton Jellinek, the plurality suggested that
addiction possibly could bar criminal liability if an individual could not stop
picking up a drink in the first place or drank to avert withdrawal. 230
Applying this understanding of addiction to Powell’s situation, the
plurality took account of the fact that he was capable of stopping after having
just one drink, the psychiatrist’s testimony that the taking of the initial drink
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 556 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 519 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 522–23.
Id. at 525.
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is a product of free will, and the fact that Powell was not in a state of
withdrawal. 231 The plurality held that the Texas statute did not run afoul of
Robinson because Powell “was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but
for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion.” 232 Put differently,
Texas “has not sought to punish a mere status” or a condition but rather “it
has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for public behavior.” 233 The
plurality clarified that Robinson stands only for the proposition that, in the
context of addiction, criminal punishment must apply to an act. 234
Justice White concurred. 235 Picking up on his dissent in Robinson, Justice
White declared that “the use of narcotics by an addict must be beyond the
reach of the criminal law. Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistible
urge to consume alcohol should not be punishable for drinking or for being
drunk.” 236 Therefore, if “a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness
is impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is also
impossible,” the statute would be unconstitutional, he determined. 237 But here,
Justice White concluded that Powell was able to control or manage where he
was drinking—even if he could not control his drinking itself: “[Powell] made
no showing that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in
question.” 238 Moreover, Justice White did not believe that the record
supported Powell’s contention that Powell was compelled to drink due to an
addiction to alcohol. 239 Accordingly, Justice White voted to affirm Powell’s
conviction. 240
Four Justices dissented. 241 Their opinion, authored by Justice Fortas,
began by noting that under the prevailing disease model “alcoholism is caused
and maintained by something other than the moral fault of the alcoholic” and
instead is “something that . . . cannot be controlled by him.” 242 Justice Fortas
interpreted Robinson to stand for a principle that “[c]riminal penalties may not
be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to

231. Id.
232. Id. at 532.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 533. Powell therefore overruled any prior, lower federal court rulings inconsistent with
this holding, such as Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). Cf. at 764 (“[O]ur excusal of the
chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution is confined exclusively to those acts on his part which are
compulsive as symptomatic of the disease. With respect to other behavior—not characteristic of
confirmed chronic alcoholism—he would be judged as would any person not so afflicted.”).
235. Id. at 548–49 (White, J., concurring).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 554.
239. Id. at 549 n.1.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 561.
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change.” 243 While Robinson “elected to take narcotics,” Justice Fortas asserted,
“[o]nce Robinson had become an addict, he was utterly powerless to avoid
criminal guilt.” 244 “He was powerless to choose not to violate the law,” he
emphasized. 245 Justice Fortas agreed that the statute at issue in Robinson
punished status, whereas the statute at issue in Powell punished conduct. 246
“But the essential constitutional defect here is the same as in Robinson, for in
both cases the particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which
he had no capacity to change or avoid.” 247 For Powell, when he took his first
drink, he became compelled to drink “to the point of intoxication; and that,
once intoxicated, he could not prevent himself from appearing in public
places,” 248 the dissent concluded. As intoxication and being intoxicated in
public were “characteristic and involuntary” symptoms of alcoholism, Powell
could not, under the dissent’s theory, be punished for these acts. 249
Accordingly, the dissenting justices would have held that the Texas statute as
applied to Powell constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 250
C.

Two Models

Robinson and Powell have produced two competing interpretations as to
when and whether an individual with an addiction may be held criminally
responsible for conduct that is symptomatic of the addiction. The analytical
distinction between the two is highlighted in Manning v. Caldwell, 251 a 2019
case in which the Fourth Circuit split in a deeply divided 8–7 en banc
opinion. 252 This section therefore draws upon this recent decision to help
illuminate the difference between the two camps.
1. The Status-Conduct Distinction
The traditional reading of the Robinson-Powell guideposts is that the
government may impose criminal punishment on an individual for their
alcohol- or drug-related conduct, but not for their status as an individual with
an addiction. Under this bright-line reading, the flaw in the California statute
at issue in Robinson was that the statute lacked any actus reus, or evil act, a
cornerstone of Anglo-American criminal law. As the statute in Powell

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567–68.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 559 n.2.
Id. at 569–70.
930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
Id. at 286.
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contained an actus reus, this argument goes, the statute did not run afoul of
the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Robinson.
Most federal circuits have adopted this straightforward status-conduct
distinction. The First Circuit put it flatly: “Proof that one acts due to
addiction . . . is not proof that one acts involuntarily.” 253 The Second Circuit
wrote that “[a]n addict who commits an affirmative illegal act, as distinguished
from one whose only anti-social behavior is the mere presence of his
addiction, may be constitutionally punished.” 254 The Fifth Circuit similarly
observed that “mere alcoholism does not constitute a mental disease or defect”
excusing one from criminal responsibility. 255 Along the same lines, the Eighth
Circuit interpreted Powell to “h[o]ld that chronic alcoholics could properly be
required to control their actions to the extent necessary to avoid collision with
the criminal law . . . .” 256 For its part, the Eleventh Circuit noted, “The
considerations that make any incarceration unconstitutional when a statute
punishes a defendant for his status are not applicable when the government
seeks to punish a person’s actions,” 257 adding in a subsequent case that the
statute at issue in Powell was “constitutionally permissible because it
punishe[d] an act, ‘being in public while drunk on a particular occasion,’ not a
status, ‘being a chronic alcoholic.’” 258 In a case producing a set of extensive
opinions, the D.C. Circuit characterized Robinson and Powell as holding that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the criminal law from punishing the mere
craving for alcohol but enables states to prohibit “the acts which give in to that
craving,” as such acts are not the product of “irresistible compulsion, or [the]
loss of self-control.” 259
2. The Categorical-Involuntary Model
In Manning, the Fourth Circuit broke with its sister courts in declining
to follow the status-conduct distinction of Robinson and Powell. 260 The case
arose out of a Virginia statute that criminalized the use or possession of
alcohol by anyone who has a prior intoxication offense or who “has shown

253. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 875 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at
535).
254. Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 1971).
255. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 245 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at
535).
256. United States v. Lame, 716 F.2d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
257. United States v. Benefield, 889 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1989).
258. Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
259. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
260. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
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himself to be an habitual drunkard.” 261 The challengers, homeless individuals
who claimed to have an addiction to alcohol, contended that “they face an
irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public.” 262 The
government-defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, which the district
court granted. 263 A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed, pointing out that
“[t]here was no majority holding [in Powell] that nonvolitional conduct could
invariably be criminalized” and that Justice White’s decisive concurrence in
Powell left open the question of whether behavioral compulsion can negate
criminal responsibility. 264 The panel echoed and affirmed the status-conduct
distinction, noting that “although states may not criminalize status, they may
criminalize actual behavior even when the individual alleges that addiction
created a strong urge to engage in a particular act.” 265 The panel therefore
rejected the constitutional challenge. 266
The full Fourth Circuit reheard the case 267 and reversed by an 8–7
vote. 268 The en banc majority asserted that, in Powell, Justice White “expressly
rejected the act-status rationale adopted by the plurality . . . .” 269 According to
the majority, Justice White “voted to affirm Powell’s conviction not because of
the act-status theory relied on by the [Powell] plurality, but solely because
Powell had not produced facts establishing the involuntariness of his public
alcoholism.” 270 The majority concluded that Justice White’s involuntaryvoluntary distinction was shared by the four dissenting Justices in Powell, and
thus is the operative standard to assess the constitutionality of criminal
statutes applying to individuals with an addiction. 271 Here, the majority held
that Virginia could not criminalize behavior that is symptomatic of an illness,

261. Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1333(A) (1993) (amended 2020)), reh’g granted, 741 F. App’x 937 (2018) (mem.), vacated, 930 F.3d
264 (2019).
262. Hendrick v. Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868, 876–77 (W.D. Va. 2017) (quoting Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion)), vacated sub nom., Manning v. Caldwell, 930
F.3d 264 (2019).
263. Id. at 895.
264. Manning, 900 F.3d at 146–47.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 153. Following Manning, the Harvard Law Review published a comment, arguing that,
“[p]unishing a homeless alcoholic for consuming alcohol is the same as punishing an alcoholic for being
an alcoholic because, by definition, alcoholics cannot control their alcohol intake unless they are in
recovery or recovered.” Recent Cases, Plurality Decisions — The Marks Rule — Fourth Circuit Declines
To Apply Justice White’s Concurrence in Powell v. Texas as Binding Precedent. — Manning v. Caldwell,
900 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2019) (emphasis added).
267. Manning v. Caldwell, 741 F. App’x 937 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
268. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
269. Id. at 280 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548–49 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
270. Id. at 282 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 549 n.1 (1968) (White, J., concurring))
(emphasis in original).
271. Id. at 280.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021)

1118

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

where the underlying behavior is otherwise legal. 272 As the case rose to the
appeals court on a motion to dismiss, the majority accepted the plaintiffs’ bare
allegations—that drinking is compelled by their addiction to alcohol—as
true. 273
The opinion provoked a stinging dissent authored by Judge Wilkinson
and joined by five of his colleagues. 274 Judge Wilkinson, reflecting the statusconduct distinction, asserted that “the criminal law cannot punish who you
are; it can only punish what you do.” 275 Accordingly, “although states may not
criminalize status, they may criminalize actual behavior even when the
individual alleges that addiction created a strong urge to engage in a particular
act,” he explained. 276
Judge Wilkinson acknowledged that in his Powell concurrence Justice
White questioned “whether conduct compelled by addiction might be
protected under Robinson.” 277 But the dissent observed that Justice White
sided with the plurality because “Powell’s behavior involved a volitional act,”
specifically whether he was in public. 278 The dissent noted therefore that
Justice White “chose to resolve the case without reaching the broader question
of compulsion,” leaving Robinson’s status-conduct distinction “undisturbed.” 279
Judge Wilkinson emphasized that “Justice White concurred in this judgment
because the statute in question involved an act that was clearly volitional,
forestalling the need to examine whether and under what conditions
nonvolitional conduct might be constitutionally shielded from criminal
sanctions.” 280 Any speculation from Justice White about whether criminal law
can reach compelled conduct constitutes mere dicta, the dissent concluded. 281
The dissent further argued that the compelled-conduct exception to
criminal law limitation is not only unsupported, but is also unworkable; 282
there is no reliable standard to assess which conduct is compelled and
therefore placed outside of the bounds of the criminal law. 283 The majority’s
272. Id. at 285; see also id. (“In sum, we hold that the challenged Virginia statutory scheme is
unconstitutionally vague, and that even assuming it could be limited to those suffering from
alcoholism, Plaintiffs have stated an Eighth Amendment claim under both Robinson and Powell.”).
273. Id. at 282.
274. Id. at 286 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Diaz filed a separate dissenting opinion, id. at
306 (Diaz, J., dissenting), bringing the total number of dissenting judges to seven.
275. Id. at 288 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 292 (“[T]here must be some behavioral
link set forth in the law.”).
276. Id. at 290–91.
277. Id. at 289.
278. Id.
279. Id.; see also id. at 290 (“[T]he Powell decision does not overturn or in any way disrupt
Robinson.”).
280. Id. at 290.
281. Id. at 291.
282. Id. at 286–87.
283. Id. at 291.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021)

2021]

CRIMINAL LAW x ADDICTION

1119

limiting principle of confining its rule to otherwise lawful conduct, the dissent
suggested, is inconsistent with the criminal law’s traditional acceptance of
legislatures barring certain classes of people, such as recidivists, from engaging
in specific behavior that others can. 284
The Ninth Circuit also appears to have moved away from the statusconduct camp. For years, and on a repeated basis, the Ninth Circuit followed
the status-conduct approach. In one case, that court held that, under Robinson,
it is unconstitutional to “criminalize[] the status of being addicted to
narcotics,” and that Powell “subsequently limited the applicability of Robinson
to crimes that do not involve an actus reus . . . .” 285 In another, the court
rejected a challenge to the application of a criminal statute, reasoning that the
defendant “is not being punished because he has [certain] status,” but rather
“he is being punished for having committed the [proscribed] act . . . .” 286 In a
third, the court refused to accept a defendant’s generous construction of
Powell, explaining with reference to Powell that the defendant’s “conduct
rather than his status as an alcoholic led to his confinement.” 287 Shortly after
Powell, the court concluded that, even if there was evidence that the defendant
“was a chronic alcoholic in the sense that he could not prevent himself from
drinking,” he would not be “excused . . . from criminal responsibility under
the present state of the law.” 288
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit started showing signs of breaking from the
prevailing status-conduct interpretation of Robinson and Powell when the court
reviewed a challenge, brought by homeless individuals who could not obtain
shelter, against a Los Angeles ordinance that criminalized the sitting, lying, or
sleeping on public streets or sidewalks within city limits. 289 The court
invalidated the ordinance, holding, as the en banc Fourth Circuit did, that
Justice White’s concurring opinion in Powell and the opinion of four
dissenting Justices together “stand for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or
condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.” 290 The
opinion was later vacated, however, when the parties to the action settled. 291

284. Id. at 296.
285. United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425–26 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
286. United States v. Parga-Rosas, 238 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 2001).
287. Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
532 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
288. Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 736 n.9 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 514 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
289. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006).
290. Id. at 1135.
291. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006, 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
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In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit in 2018 considered a challenge,
brought by homeless individuals unable to obtain shelter, to the
constitutionality of a Boise ordinance that criminalized sleeping outside in
public within city limits. 292 The court stated that, though it was not bound by
the vacated 2006 opinion, it nonetheless was persuaded by its reasoning. 293
Applying the standard cobbled together from the Powell concurring and
dissenting opinions, the Ninth Circuit determined that sleeping in public was
an unavoidable consequence of the defendants’ status as homeless individuals,
as the city had run out of beds for the homeless, and thus homeless individuals
had no option but to sleep outside. 294
The case was referred for possible en banc review and in 2019 the full
court declined to rehear the case. 295 But six judges dissented from the denial of
en banc review, indicating a strong disagreement with the panel opinion’s
apparent departure from the status-conduct distinction. 296 Judge Smith,
writing for the six dissenting judges, expressly charged that the panel
misinterpreted Powell. 297 The appropriate way to apply Powell, he argued, was
not to combine the concurrence and dissent into a quasi-holding, but to
identify the narrow, substantive overlap between the concurrence and
plurality opinions. 298 The Powell concurrence and plurality agreed, the dissent
argued, that Powell’s “conviction was constitutional because it involved the
commission of an act. Nothing more, nothing less.” 299 As the dissent could not
convince enough judges to revisit the panel opinion, the pathbreaking
approach adopted by the panel opinion remains the law of the circuit.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach may signal a deeper split among the
federal circuits on the meaning of Robinson and Powell, and specifically
whether and when conduct may be deemed involuntary for purposes of
criminal law. While the Ninth Circuit’s interpretations of Robinson and Powell
arise in the context of homelessness, not addiction, its reasoning applies to the
addiction context, and there is no basis to suspect that the rationale adopted
by the Circuit is limited to matters of homelessness.
*

*

*

Courts and scholars agree that Robinson prohibits the government from
imposing criminal liability on an individual for having the status of an
292. Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 920
F.3d 584 (2019).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1048.
295. Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 2019).
296. Id. at 590 (Smith, J., dissenting).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 591.
299. Id.
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individual with drug or alcohol disease. Accordingly, being an individual with
drug or alcohol disease or having the condition of addiction cannot be the
basis, by itself, for the imposition of criminal liability. The unanimity stops
there. Most circuits hold that, under Powell, no constitutional issue arises from
the imposition of criminal punishment for an actus reus, such as being
intoxicated, even if the actus reus is symptomatic of an addiction, such as an
addiction to alcohol. 300 But under the emerging minority view—championed
by the Fourth Circuit and joined perhaps by the Ninth—Powell stands for the
principle that an action compelled by addiction is not voluntary and criminal
liability predicated on that compelled action is thus inappropriate. In the next
part, I argue that both models are flawed, and I propose an alternative that is
more legally and clinically sound.
III. AN INDIVIDUALIZED, EMPIRICAL MODEL
This part argues that the two competing interpretations of Powell—the
majority view that an individual with an addiction can be punished for
conduct and the emerging view that an individual with drug or alcohol disease
cannot be punished for nonvolitional conduct—are both wrong. First, Justice
White voted to uphold Powell’s conviction because the statute applied to
volitional conduct and because Powell could not show that his conduct was not
volitional. The status-conduct approach, asking only whether a statute
criminalizes conduct irrespective of its volitional character, therefore is wrong
because it focuses only on the presence of an actus reus and denies the
individual the opportunity to make a particularized showing that criminal
liability is not appropriate. Second, while the Fourth Circuit adopted the
correct understanding of Justice White’s concurring opinion, it mistakenly
treated all individuals with an addiction as categorically immune from
criminal responsibility. As Justice White’s opinion and addiction-related
sources such as medical studies, twelve-step literature, addiction treatment
programs, and drug court programs indicate, an individual with an addiction
to drugs or alcohol can exercise choice as to whether to address the addiction.
Therefore, courts should probe whether, according to the facts—not merely
the label of addiction—the individual with an addiction could exercise that
choice. The Fourth Circuit did not examine these individualized conditions,
looking instead to the diagnosis alone as a shield to criminal liability.
This part therefore argues in favor of a third, evidentiary model in which
an individual with an addiction must prove that addressing the addiction was
300. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that an addiction
defense under Powell would result in a “multitude of acts which are now crimes” being “excused if
[such] defense w[as] accepted”); Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 289–90 (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases holding that punishment for unlawful conduct resulting from drug and
alcohol disease is not unconstitutional).
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not possible and therefore lacks the culpability or blameworthiness necessary
for criminal liability to attach. It outlines what this showing would entail and
further explains that this showing is a difficult one. As such, the defense to
liability is commensurately narrow.
A.

Conduct and Choice

The Marks Rule. The general response to the question of whether and
when an individual with an addiction may be held criminally responsible for
acts symptomatic of the addiction boils down to a more specific question:
How should courts properly interpret the fractured plurality opinion in
Powell? It appears undisputed that Justice White’s opinion is controlling. The
dispute instead centers on the precedential standard to be extracted from that
opinion. The courts are right to look to Justice White’s concurring opinion;
the Supreme Court’s Marks v. United States 301 rule instructs courts, in the
event of a plurality opinion, to give effect to the concurring opinion’s overlap
with the plurality opinion. 302 The Supreme Court’s ruling in University of
California Regents v. Bakke 303 —concerning the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions—offers a helpful example of the application of the Marks
principle. In Bakke, the Court issued a plurality opinion. 304 Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion, which supplied the fifth vote for the judgment, is
understood to be the controlling opinion in the case. 305 Whereas the plurality
found four compelling state interests to justify the admissions system at issue,
Justice Powell accepted only one such reason; it is only that one reason that
has any precedential value moving forward because it is the only overlap
between the plurality and the concurring opinion. 306
Here, most circuits are incorrect to interpret Justice White’s concurrence
in Powell as the basis for a binding status-conduct distinction. It is true that
the plurality in Powell strictly followed Robinson’s status-conduct distinction
and therefore asked only whether the statute criminalized Powell for being an
individual with drug or alcohol disease (status) or whether it criminalized an
actus reus (conduct). 307 The statute contained two actions—1) being drunk and

301. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
302. See id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (plurality opinion))).
303. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
304. Id. at 267–68.
305. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 741 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
306. See id.
307. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (plurality opinion).
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2) being drunk outside—and for the plurality, the existence of an actus reus
was sufficient to distinguish Powell’s case from Robinson. 308
If Justice White agreed with the status-conduct distinction, he would
have upgraded the 4–1–4 plurality into a 5–4 majority. 309 But Justice White’s
exploration of whether Powell had shown that he was unable to control these
two actions demonstrates that he was not only concerned with whether Powell
had committed an identifiable actus reus. Rather, his opinion and vote to
uphold the constitutionality of the conviction hinged entirely on the absence
of this showing. Indeed, it was dispositive to Justice White that Powell failed
to prove that he had no choice to be outside. 310 This reading of Justice White’s
opinion is also faithful to his dissent in Robinson. There, Justice White
suggested that his vote may have changed if Robinson “was convicted for
being an addict who had lost his power of self-control . . . .” 311
Justice White indicated that the other relevant conduct, being drunk,
could be involuntary too. 312 This speculation about compelled use itself may
be set aside as dicta. 313 But the importance of the voluntary nature of Powell’s
location to Justice White’s opinion demonstrates that Justice White looked
deeper than the status-conduct distinction to ensure specifically that the
criminalized conduct was voluntary. Under Marks, Justice White’s
voluntariness requirement serves as the narrowest grounds, and thus the
controlling standard, because it restricts the universe of what may be
criminalized from any conduct (plurality view) to voluntary conduct
(concurring view), 314 much in the same way that Justice Powell’s concurring
opinion in Bakke limited the universe of acceptable reasons for affirmative
action from four to one. 315
Importance of Voluntariness. As a matter of first principles, insisting that
an individual’s conduct is voluntary prior to the imposition of criminal
penalties is most sensible. It is a basic assumption of criminal law that
308. See id.
309. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirm that Robinson was limited to prohibiting the
imposition of criminal punishment for having an addiction to the use of drugs and does not extend to
the statutes concerning the use itself. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)
(interpreting Robinson as holding that punishment “may not be imposed as a penalty for ‘the “status”
of narcotic addiction’”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287 (1983) (stating that Robinson invalidated
“the crime of being ‘addicted to the use of narcotics’”(quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
665 (1962)) (emphasis added)); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 268 (1980) (noting that Robinson
invalidated the “statute making it a crime to be addicted to the use of narcotics” (emphasis added)).
310. Powell, 392 U.S. at 554 (White, J., concurring).
311. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685 (White, J., dissenting).
312. Powell, 392 U.S. at 549 (White, J., concurring).
313. See Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 290 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting).
314. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
315. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299–300 (1978).
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individuals possess the capacity both to understand the limits on conduct
established by law and to conform their conduct accordingly. 316 Criminal
liability, therefore, is predicated on the choice by the individual to step
beyond the boundaries of lawful conduct; without such choice, the individual
is not suited to criminal punishment. Justice White’s approach—
contemplating the possibility that the conduct of the individual with drug or
alcohol disease is not truly voluntary—pays tribute to the foundational
requirement that criminal liability follows individual agency.
Therefore, the majority view is wrong to ask only whether criminal
punishment attaches to an actus reus. Instead, the courts should ensure that
the relevant conduct is voluntary. In this respect, the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits are correct to focus on whether the relevant actions are voluntary and
not only whether the statute proscribes some cognizable action.
The Evidentiary Approach in Criminal Law. The individualized inquiry
contemplated by Justice White is not uncommon in the criminal context. The
Seventh Circuit, for example, considered an argument that a defendant “is
immune from prosecution [for receiving, distributing, and possessing child
pornography] because as a pedophile or ephebophile he is compelled to
collect, receive and distribute child pornography.” 317 The court did not accept
the bald assertion that the defendant’s disease rendered the relevant conduct
beyond his control. Rather, the court noted that, even if the defendant “is a
pedophile and/or ephebophile and . . . his receipt, distribution and possession
of child pornography ‘was a pathological symptom of [his] pedophilia and/or
ephebophilia,’” the defendant “did not show that this charged conduct was
involuntary or uncontrollable.” 318 The facts proved the opposite; according to
psychological reports, the “defendant could control his impulses to access child
pornography,” irrespective of the claim that he had an associated disease. 319
Thus, there is existing support in the criminal context for the proposition that
a disease alone does not determine whether prohibited conduct is voluntary.
The dispositive question instead, as reflected in Justice White’s concurrence
and the Seventh Circuit opinion, is whether the defendant can nonetheless
prove that the unlawful conduct is involuntary in light of their individual
circumstances.
B.

Addiction and Choice

For its part, the Fourth Circuit categorically equates the status of
addiction with compulsion to drink or use. 320 In doing so, it assumes that all
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
See Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
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individuals with drug or alcohol disease are categorically incapable of
exercising choice as to drinking or using. 321 This assumption is wrong. Medical
literature, twelve-step fellowship programs, substance use disorder programs,
and drug court programs all support the proposition that an individual with
drug or alcohol disease can be capable of choice and thus may be the proper
subject of criminal sanction.
As a threshold matter, the involuntary acquisition of a disease, for which
the individual lacks any blameworthiness, does not negate the responsibility to
exercise choice once the disease is acquired. On the contrary, an individual is
blameworthy for failing to fulfill that responsibility. As further explained
below, the existence of the disease does not mean that the individual with an
addiction lacks awareness of the adverse manifestations of the disease; lacks
the opportunity or duty to address the disease; lacks workable options to
address the disease; is automatically compelled to drink or use; is categorically
compelled to drink or use; or is to be defined by the label of the disease rather
than by that awareness, opportunity, viable options, or individual
circumstances.
Irrelevance of Involuntary Acquisition. Under the disease model of
addiction, the individual is not to blame for having an alcohol or substance use
disorder. 322 But the involuntary acquisition of the disease does not render the
individual categorically incapable of addressing the disease and its adverse
manifestations. As noted by Dr. David Linden, a neurologist at Johns
Hopkins University, “The development of an addiction is not the addict’s
fault”; however, “believing that addiction is a disease does not absolve addicts
from responsibility for their own recovery.” 323 “It’s not a free ride,” he
added. 324
Capacity for Conscious Awareness. An individual with alcohol or drug
disease can form a conscious awareness that their drinking or use is
problematic and therefore warrants a corrective response. Twelve-step
fellowship programs note that the individual with an addiction may be
conscious of the troubling nature of drinking or using, even while drinking or

321. See id.
322. See Hanna Pickard, Responsibility Without Blame for Addiction, 10 NEUROETHICS 169, 177
(2017) (“According to the disease model, addicts are neither responsible nor to blame; their condition
is the result of a disease that has taken hold, and so the negative consequences of drug use are no
one’s fault . . . .”).
323. Mary Carole McCauley, Johns Hopkins Neuroscientist David Linden Explains the Biology of
Pleasure, BALT. SUN (Apr. 14, 2011, 8:30 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bal-definingaddiction-0414-story-story.html [https://perma.cc/CD2H-J5VQ (dark archive)].
324. Id.; see also Sara Gordon, About a Revolution: Toward Integrated Treatment in Drug and Mental
Health Courts, 97 N.C. L. REV. 355, 372 (2019) (“[E]ven if we accept that addiction is a disease of the
brain, it is still the case that the addicted individual has a significant role to play both in her illness
and her recovery.”).
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using. Indeed, the AA’s’ “Big Book” references an individual with drug or
alcohol disease who reveals, “I was having these little moments of clarity,
times I knew for sure that I was an alcoholic. Times when I was looking at the
bottom of my glass asking myself, Why am I doing this?” 325 The very first
step in the twelve-steps is an admission that the individual’s life has become
“unmanageable” due to alcohol. 326 This admission necessarily requires an
awareness of both the destructive impact of alcohol and the source of that
destruction, namely alcohol. The individual’s tremendous capacity for guilt
and shame further reinforces the individual’s capacity for reflection as to the
negative consequences of drinking or using. 327
Drug treatment programs likewise link conscious thought to drinking or
using. Take, for instance, the conceptualization of relapse by a wellestablished treatment facility in the Washington, DC, area, which notes that
relapse is preceded by prior thoughts rationalizing the drinking or use, beliefs
that drinking or use will be pleasurable, and ultimately permission to drink or
use. 328 A federal court similarly reasoned that, even if an individual with
addiction lacks control while intoxicated, “such substance abusers are not
regarded as deprived of free will for offenses committed during ‘lucid’
intervals.” 329 Unless the individual is in a state of fixed insanity, these
intervals serve as opportunities for the individual to reflect and resolve to
address the illness. 330
The Duty to Mitigate. Alcohol and drug use impose significant costs on
the individual and society at large. Consider that, in a twelve-month period
ending in May of 2020, over 81,000 individuals died of a drug-related
overdose. 331 Similarly, the estimated economic impact of the opioid
epidemic—including deaths, health care costs, and criminal justice

325. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THE BIG BOOK 284 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter THE BIG
BOOK].
326. See id. at 59 (“We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become
unmanageable.”).
327. See, e.g., Masuma Rahim & Robert Patton, The Association Between Shame and Substance Use
in Young People: A Systematic Review, PEERJ, Jan. 22, 2015, at 3, 3 (“As [adolescent substance users’]
capacity for self-reflection . . . develops, adolescents are more likely to compare themselves negatively
to peers . . . .”).
328. Glossary of Terms, KOLMAC OUTPATIENT RECOVERY, https://www.kolmac.com/
understanding-addiction/glossary-of-terms/ [https://perma.cc/WBG8-QZ8V].
329. United States v. Shorter, 618 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.D.C. 1985).
330. See also Morse, supra note 179, at 171 (“Even if addiction is properly characterized as an
illness, most addicts are nonetheless capable of being guided by good reasons, including the
incentives law can provide. Sick people who behave immorally or who violate the criminal law are
almost always responsible agents.”).
331. See Robin Foster, U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths Reach Record Highs, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2020-12-17/usdrug-overdose-deaths-reach-record-highs [https://perma.cc/XD3U-B99E (dark archive)].
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expenditures—is $179 billion in one year. 332 In addition, drunk driving vehicle
accidents cause over 10,000 deaths per year in the United States, an average of
one death every 50 minutes. 333 These deaths and associated costs, according to
the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, impose a yearly
financial cost of $44 billion. 334 The human toll of addiction and overdoses
cannot be ignored or understated. Judge Marielsa Bernard, whose daughter
died of an overdose, shares: “You go through hell when you have an addicted
child because you just never know what’s gonna happen—they become
someone you don’t really know . . . . After they die, you’re in hell still, but it’s
a different kind of hell.” 335 As these figures and words indicate, alcohol and
drug use can kill individuals, destroy families, and unleash significant personal
and financial costs on society.
Conscious awareness of alcohol and drug use permits awareness of the
consequences—both actual and potential—of that use. An individual who is
consciously aware of their alcohol or drug use has an affirmative moral and
social duty to address those consequences. In the very first step in the twelve
steps of AA, the individual admits that they alone are “powerless” over
alcohol. 336 Though the individual by themselves is powerless as to alcohol, AA
explains that the individual is “not powerless over assuming responsibility for
[her] own recovery.” 337
332. See Selena Simmons-Duffin, The Real Cost of the Opioid Epidemic: An Estimated $179 Billon in
Just 1 Year, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 24, 2019, 4:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/10/24/773148861/calculating-the-real-costs-of-the-opioid-epidemic
[https://perma.cc/
P3YK-N7DN].
333. Drunk Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY. TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/riskydriving/drunk-driving [https://perma.cc/7YL5-A62W].
334. Id.
335. Cindy Rich, A Mother’s Heartbreak: Heroin’s Toll in Montgomery County, BETHESDA
MAG. (Nov. 2, 2015, 1:50 PM), https://bethesdamagazine.com/bethesda-magazine/novemberdecember-2015/a-mothers-heartbreak-heroins-toll-in-montgomery-county/ [https://perma.cc/QAQ2P6P9 (dark archive)]. There are countless accounts of families coping with the grief of losing a loved
one and of supporting one another following a loss.
336. THE BIG BOOK, supra note 325, at 59. The notion that the individual is unable to extricate
themselves from the grips of addiction is found in perhaps the earliest reference to addiction in the
United States. In 1778, Anthony Benezet wrote, “The unhappy dram-drinkers are [s]o ab[s]olutely
bound in [s]lavery to the[s]e infernal [s]pirits, that they [s]eem to have lo[s]t the power of delivering
them[s]elves from this wor[s]t of bondage.” Anthony Benezet, Remarks on the Nature and Bad Effects of
Spirituous Liquors, in SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 40, 42 (1778)
(emphasis added).
337. DAILY REFLECTIONS, supra note 121, at Jan. 3. That said, an emerging alternative
fellowship program, SMART Recovery, expressly disagrees that the individual is personally
powerless to effectuate change in respect to their drug of choice. Compare About SMART Recovery,
SMART RECOVERY (2019), https://www.smartrecovery.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/4RQ8P6QY] (“You may believe, for example, that you’re powerless, or that after the first drink you lose all
control and can’t stop. These beliefs may actually be damaging to you.”), with THE BIG BOOK, supra
note 325, at 24 (“The fact is that most alcoholics . . . have lost the power of choice in drink.”
(emphasis omitted)). SMART Recovery instead seeks to support the individual’s ability to change
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For an individual with an addiction to avert this responsibility because
their addiction is a disease or was involuntarily acquired would be to shift the
costs of the action away from the individual and onto society; thus, an
individual would be free to leave a disease unaddressed. We would not want
an individual in active addiction to hurt themselves or others any more than
we would want an individual with poor eyesight to walk around without
glasses or contacts and wander into traffic, or worse. The disability context is
instructive: if an individual does not take such responsive efforts, “it is wholly
proper to say that [their] disability flows, not from the disease or injury itself”
but from the “voluntary failure or refusal to take the available corrective or
ameliorative action.” 338 Similarly, there is no reason to exempt an individual
with drug or alcohol disease wholesale from the responsibility to offset the
problematic manifestations of the addiction. Leading criminal law theorist
Sanford Kadish explained that the disease of addiction does not negate that
responsibility:
To find that criminal conduct is causally related to persistent patterns
of behavior which are to some extent medically treatable (for this is
what sickness here presumably connotes) does not establish that
punishment is unjust. Being ’sick’ in this sense does not mean or imply
that the person is irresponsible and not morally culpable. Just as a
psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness does not itself establish a defense
of legal insanity, neither does a diagnosis of addiction establish that the
addict is not responsible for his actions. 339
Fulfilling the Duty To Mitigate. Individuals with addiction to drugs or
alcohol can and do take action to convert the conscious desire to address the
disease into “efforts” to address the disease. 340 Those efforts include seeking
and obtaining treatment. “Research shows that treatment can help drugaddicted individuals stop drug use, avoid relapse and successfully recover their
lives.” 341 The corrective efforts can also include participation in fellowship
programs. 342 According to one report, over one million Americans are part of
her thoughts, and thus their habits. See About SMART Recovery, supra (“In SMART we focus on
learning coping skills that work well short- and long-term.”); Peter Soderman, What We Can Learn,
We Can Unlearn, SMART RECOVERY, https://www.smartrecovery.org/what-we-can-learn-we-canunlearn-1/ [https://perma.cc/FAF6-7YA6] (“Your brain is constantly changing, and you have
ultimate control over it—for good or ill.”).
338. Baker v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 782 F.2d 993, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
339. Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 286 (1987).
340. DSM-5, supra note 133, at 490.
341. What Is a Substance Use Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Dec. 2020), https://
www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/addiction/what-is-addiction [https://perma.cc/T7TT-MSQ4].
342. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80, at 25. Twelve-step programs tout themselves as
the most reliable means by which to eliminate the adverse impact of addiction and to achieve a life of
sobriety, health, and freedom. See THE BIG BOOK, supra note 325, at 58; Effectiveness of 12
Step Programs, BURNING TREE (2019), https://www.burningtree.com/effectiveness-12-step-programs/
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AA, 343 each person serving as proof that those with the disease can and do
respond to the disease. This approach can be effective. Indeed, a little-known
fact is that the original name for the AA text was “The Way Out,” 344
reflecting fellowship-based recovery as a viable means of transitioning from
active addiction to sobriety. 345
Distinguishing Between Addiction and Involuntariness. That individuals with
alcohol or drug disease may be aware of their actions and that there are viable
options to address the disease cut against the notion that individual drinking
or using automatically or categorically rises to the level of a cognizable
compulsion. Professors Richard Holton and Kent Berridge write that “the
brain of an addict is importantly different from that of a normal nonaddicted
individual” and that “once addiction is under way, the desire for the addictive
drug takes on a life of its own, with an intensity that is particularly, perhaps
uniquely, high.” 346 But this fact, they point out, should not be equated with
involuntary conduct: “[T]he intensity and power of addictive desires do[es]
not mean that addicts are automata, standing powerless spectators as they are
moved by their desires.” 347
The traditional bar for involuntariness is particularly high. Indeed, in
ordinary criminal law, involuntariness exists where the actus reus is a reflexive
or conditioned response to external stimuli. 348 A classic illustration of
involuntariness is the war veteran who responds unconsciously to stressful
situations. 349 What sets these instances of involuntariness apart from the
[https://perma.cc/BD9P-CP55] (“Research shows that that most effective plan is one that includes a
treatment program followed by participation in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) . . . .”); Michael Miller,
The Relevance of Twelve-Step Recovery in 21st Century Addiction Medicine, AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION
MED. (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.asam.org/resources/publications/magazine/read/article/2015/
02/13/the-relevance-of-twelve-step-recovery-in-21st-century-addiction-medicine [https://perma.cc/
XD4P-47LL] (“Twelve Step Facilitation therapy is still a tried-and-true proven approach. It is far
more than advising a patient to ‘go to AA’ and providing them a list of meeting locations and
times.”).
343. Katy Steinmetz, AA Around the World, TIME (Jul. 2, 2010), http://content.time.com/
time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2001284_2001057_2001044,00.html [https://perma.cc/V59WHEZL].
344. See DAILY REFLECTIONS, supra note 121, at Nov. 25 (explaining that the original title was
discarded once it was discovered that books with similar titles were on the market).
345. See THE BIG BOOK, supra note 325, at 58 (“Rarely have we seen a person fail who has
thoroughly followed our path.”).
346. Richard Holton & Kent Berridge, Addiction Between Compulsion and Choice, in ADDICTION
AND SELF-CONTROL: PERSPECTIVES FROM PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND NEUROSCIENCE
239, 241 (Neil Levy ed., 2013).
347. Id. at 242.
348. LAFAVE, supra note 171, § 9.4.
349. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 538 P.2d 829, 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (“On the witness stand
Mr. Perkins recalled all of the incidents which led up to the shooting . . . but ‘then everything went
black.’ His next recollection is walking to a vehicle accompanied by a deputy sheriff.”); State v.
Utter, 479 P.2d 946, 947–48 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (“Conditioned response was defined by [a
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addiction context is that the former do not involve conscious awareness of the
conduct: the body responds while the individual is unconscious or before there
is any deliberation or opportunity to deliberate. 350 For the individual with
drug or alcohol disease, by contrast, the underlying conduct may be
appreciated. 351 Consistent with this general understanding and the concept of
lucid intervals, Professor Kadish explained:
[T]he characteristic actions of an addict could hardly be made to fit [the
meaning of an involuntary act]. They are movements he chooses to
make to achieve his purposes and therefore have nothing in common
with falling or being pushed or with reflexive or convulsive movements,
or even with sleepwalking or hypnotic movements. There is a
substantial difference between those movements and the complex and
varied activities involved in obtaining and using alcohol and other
drugs. There are enough conscious, purposive actions in the
characteristic behavior of addicts (including abstinence when the
motivation is great enough) that it cannot possibly be considered
involuntary. 352
Because conduct that is symptomatic of the addiction can be voluntary, it
may be properly punished. Take for example drug courts, generally specialized
courts that promote treatment of defendants charged with nonviolent conduct
that stems from their drinking or use. 353 In drug court, jail is a common
sanction for a program participant who relapses while in the program. The
National Drug Court Institute notes that “Drug Courts typically administer a
gradually escalating sequence of consequences for substance use. The earliest
consequences often involve enhancing treatment services, whereas later
consequences may include punitive sanctions of increasing severity.” 354 Some
psychiatrist at trial] as ‘an act or a pattern of activity occurring so rapidly, so uniformly as to be
automatic in response to certain stimulus.’ [Appellant] testified that as a result of his jungle warfare
training and experiences in World War II, he had on two occasions in the 1950’s reacted violently
towards people approaching him unexpectedly from the rear.”).
350. See LAFAVE, supra note 171, § 6.1(c) (defining a voluntary act as one in which the “mind has
quickly grasped the situation and dictated some action”).
351. See supra notes 325–30 and accompanying text.
352. Kadish, supra note 339, at 286–87.
353. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION COURT
PROGRAMS 5 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research
-publications/2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D3B-9A3K].
354. DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 101 FOR
DRUG COURTS: MAKING THE MOST OF INCENTIVES AND SANCTIONS 5 (2012); see also RYAN S.
KING & JILL PASQARELLA, THE SENT’G PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
4 (2009) (“A participant who is non-compliant with any of the drug court protocols can be sanctioned
through a variety of means, including increased status hearings, drug tests or jail time. . . . [F]or
persons who have violated the terms of their drug court sentence by relapsing, . . . a judge can . . .
impos[e] some type of sanction, including a brief period of incarceration.”); cf. Mike Riggs, Want To
Go to Drug Court? Say Goodbye to Your Rights: Why the Bipartisan Push for Drug Courts Is Overrated,
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drug courts adopt this approach of reserving jail for multiple positive
urinalysis results, 355 while others may send a participant to jail even for the
first positive urine test. 356
Ostensibly, these sanctions are premised on the principle that the
individual can conform their conduct to the behavioral requirements of the
drug court program, including abstinence from alcohol and drugs. The failure
to adhere to these requirements thus may be met with punitive
consequences—even though the program participant has an addiction to drugs
and/or alcohol. It is unclear why individuals with drug or alcohol disease may
be held responsible for their actions and deemed appropriate subjects of
punishment in the specialized drug court context but not in the criminal
justice system overall.
Addiction Cannot Be Categorically Examined. How an individual with an
addiction can effectively address their addiction depends on the nature and
circumstances of the individual. As the National Institute on Drug Abuse
notes, “[n]o single treatment is appropriate for everyone.” 357 Treatment
programs and twelve-step fellowship programs likewise stress that no person’s
treatment or recovery will be identical. 358
The disability context similarly emphasizes the need to appraise the
specific situation facing the individual when making a disability
determination. Consider a debate that arose between two circuits as to
whether an individual who achieves good grades nonetheless can be an
individual with a learning disability. On one hand, the Second Circuit held
that the relevant question in determining whether a student has a cognizable
(Aug. 17, 2012, 10:30 AM), https://reason.com/2012/08/17/want-to-go-to-drug-court-saygoodbye-to/ [https://perma.cc/SWB5-597J] (“In every [drug] court that receives federal funding, jail
is a mandatory penalty.”).
355. E.g., PALM BEACH CNTY. DRUG CT. OFF., DRUG COURT TABLE OF SANCTIONS
(assigning a twenty-four-hour jail sanction to a second positive urinalysis result).
356. E.g., BLUE EARTH CNTY. ADULT HYBRID DRUG CT., PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 24 (“If
you have a positive test in any drug court phase, the judge, based on recommendations from the drug
court team, will apply immediate sanctions including time in jail to help you stop your drug using
behavior.”); MONTGOMERY CNTY. ADULT DRUG CT. INTERVENTION TRACK, PARTICIPANT
HANDBOOK 33 (including jail time in the various sanctions available to courts after a single positive
urinalysis result).
357. Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 4; see also id. (“Treatment varies depending on
the type of drug and the characteristics of the patients. Matching treatment settings, interventions,
and services to an individual’s particular problems and needs is critical to his or her ultimate success
in returning to productive functioning in the family, workplace, and society.”).
358. See, e.g., THE BIG BOOK, supra note 325, at xxv (2009) (“I personally know scores of cases
who were of the type with whom other methods had failed completely.”); Our Treatment Philosophy,
CARON, https://www.caron.org/proven-treatment/treatment-philosophy [https://perma.cc/XP95V8AY] (“We tailor clinically proven addiction treatment plans to each patient and family member.”);
Where Can I Get the Best Addiction Treatment Programs in MD?, ASHLEY ADDICTION TREATMENT,
https://www.ashleytreatment.org/addiction-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/XBL7-VNUV] (“Every
individual’s road to addiction is unique.”).
REASON
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learning disability is the “condition[], manner, or duration” of the purported
limitation, as regulations prescribe. 359 Under this interpretation, a student who
strains to earn good grades because of a limitation may be qualified as an
individual with a disability notwithstanding the grades themselves. In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that a student who performed well
academically, under the same circumstances as other students, simply could
not be an individual with a disability: “[The plaintiff’s] claim to be ‘disabled’
was contradicted by his ability to achieve academic success, and to do so
without special accommodations.” 360
The Fourth Circuit, in the addiction context, seemed to side with the
Ninth Circuit, categorically equating addiction with an absence of choice
much like categorically equating academic achievement with an absence of a
disability. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit was satisfied with a blanket statement
that the individuals possess an addiction, declining to engage in an
individualized inquiry as to the nature of the individual’s addiction as it
relates to their conduct. 361
In the disability context, Congress has expressly rejected a categorical
approach in which an individual would be considered an individual with a
disability on the basis of label or diagnosis alone. More specifically, Congress
has made clear that having a diagnosed impairment will not automatically
satisfy the definition of having a disability. 362 Instead, Congress emphasized
that the conditions, manner, and duration under which the individual lives are
what matter for purposes of disability determinations. 363
While Congress has codified the individualized approach taken by the
Second Circuit in the learning disability context, it has yet to do so with the
Fourth Circuit’s categorical approach in the addiction context. The diverse
presentations of addiction, the unique paths to recovery, and the courts’
related insistence on individualized assessments of physical and mental
impairments, all undermine this categorical approach. Professors Richard
Holton and Kent Berridge counsel that, “We should . . . not be thinking of
addictive desires as things that are impossible to resist, but as things that are

359. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 226 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis
omitted).
360. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005); see also id. (“Most
notably, Wong completed the first two years of the medical school program, the academic courses, on
a normal schedule, with a grade point average slightly above a ‘B,’ and he passed the required national
board examination at that point, both without the benefit of any special accommodations.”).
361. See Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 281–84 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
362. See 35 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1)(v) (2020).
363. See Id. § 35.108(d)(3).
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very difficult to resist.” 364 The courts should probe the nature of that difficulty
on an individual basis.
This discussion suggests that various factors—the lucid intervals during
which an individual with an addiction may be aware of their addiction and the
adverse consequences of addictive addiction, the moral and social
responsibility to mitigate the harms stemming from the addiction, and viable
options to fulfill that responsibility—support the conclusion that an individual
with an addiction may be capable of the choice necessary for criminal liability
to attach. This determination is further bolstered by the distinction between
addiction and involuntariness, and the impropriety of categorically assessing
addiction.
C.

Addiction and the Purposes of Punishment

The argument that an individual with alcohol or drug disease is amenable
to punishment must be consistent with the underlying purposes of
punishment. These purposes supply the theoretical and principled foundation
for criminal law. Each of the traditional justifications for the imposition of
punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
support the application of general criminal liability to an individual with drug
or alcohol disease. 365
First, retributive theory authorizes the imposition of punishment on the
individual with alcohol or drug disease. Retribution provides that an
individual deserves punishment because they are morally responsible for
inflicting harm or risk of harm on society. 366 To a retributivist, the individual
is a moral agent capable of choice and, if the individual decides to violate the
law, society must impose consequences on the individual for that choice. 367
Retribution thus pays respect to the moral agency of the individual and
completes the bargain that the social contract sets forth: if you break the law,
you are owed punishment. 368
An individual with diminished capacity is less deserving of punishment
in a retributivist system. 369 From this lens, it may be tempting to suggest that
364. Richard Holton & Kent Berridge, Compulsion and Choice in Addiction, in ADDICTION AND
CHOICE: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 153, 155 (Nick Heather & Gabriel Segal eds., 2017).
365. See Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 422–23 (D.C. 1975).
366. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (2d ed. 1968) (defining
retribution as “the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty”).
367. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 677–78 (2015).
368. Id. (“[U]nder a retributivist framework, the offender is paying a ‘debt’ owed to society for
the improper ‘benefits and burdens’ that he or she received from or imposed on others, which, when
paid, restores an equilibrium within society.”).
369. See id. at 708 (“Our criminal law . . . does not . . . punish those who cannot make moral
choices for themselves, such as children, the intellectually disabled, or the insane. These individuals
are considered categorically ineligible for criminal sanction because they cannot be ‘blameworthy in
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an individual with an alcohol or drug disease is less deserving of punishment
because their disease exerts downward pressure on their ability to exercise free
will and make a meaningfully voluntary choice as to whether to drink or
use. 370 But, as noted above, the person’s conscious awareness of the disease,
and an unwillingness to address the manifestations of the disease, changes the
theoretical dynamic: one is culpable for what one deliberately ignores or fails
to sufficiently address. 371 In this sense, punishing the individual with alcohol
or drug disease would be consistent with retributive principles.
Second, as Justice Breyer put it, deterrence attempts to ensure, through
punishment, that “crime does not and will not pay.” 372 An individual with an
alcohol or drug disease may be deterred insofar as they are consciously aware
of their actions. Conscious awareness enables a possible weighing of
competing considerations, including any probability of detection and
punishment.
Third, incapacitation offers the strongest basis for punishment of an
individual with an alcohol or drug disease. Incapacitation is premised on the
notion that punishment should be designed to physically separate the
wrongdoer from others, thus limiting their ability to engage in further harmful
actions. 373 Blackstone wrote that incapacitation “depriv[es] the party injuring
of the power to do future mischief.” 374 Here, incapacitation would support the
imposition of punishment even as to involuntary acts because the individual is
incapable of self-regulation and has revealed an inability to keep themselves
within the bounds of the law. Judge Posner observed, for example, that an
individual suffering from a condition warrants a “heavier sentence” under
mind’; they lack the requisite mental capacity to meaningfully choose between good and evil.”
(quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952))).
370. See Alfred Blumstein, The Search for the Elusive Common “Principle”, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 43,
47 (1988) (“[T]ake two convicted robbers, one of whom is found to be a heavy user of drugs and the
other who is not. In desert terms, the drug-user deserves a lesser sentence because the drugs had
affected his behavior, leaving him with diminished capacity. Many would thus adjudge him less
blameworthy than a non-drug-abusing robber.”).
371. See Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, A Sober Assessment of the Link Between Substance
Abuse and Crime — Eliminating Drug and Alcohol Use from the Sentencing Calculus, 56 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 243, 278 (2016) (“[A]ddiction . . . may be less mitigating . . . where the defendant has had
numerous opportunities for treatment and has either declined drug treatment or failed to
meaningfully attempt to complete drug treatment.” (quoting United States v. Hendrickson, 25 F.
Supp. 3d 1166, 1175 (N.D. Iowa 2014))).
372. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 47 (1998).
373. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 515 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If imprisonment
does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him from
committing additional crimes in the outside world.”); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 989 (1985) (“Proponents of the incapacitation approach believe that
the best way to prevent a particular offender from committing future crimes is to remove him from
society.”).
374. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11–12.
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incapacitation principles because that sentence “will reduce his lifetime
criminal activity by incapacitating him for a longer time than if he received a
lighter sentence.” 375 Similarly, the individual who claims that their drinking or
using is compelled by disease and beyond their control would be making a
classic case for punishment under incapacitation principles: a person who
cannot stop crossing the line must be separated from society so as to protect
that society, irrespective of the reasons for the lack of control.
Finally, the rehabilitative theory of punishment also strongly justifies the
imposition of punishment on an individual with alcohol or drug disease. The
rehabilitative theory posits that punishment is appropriate to reform or
correct the individual’s behavior. 376 This personal growth and development
inures not only to the benefit of the individual but also to the society to which
they will return, as the individual will pose less danger to society and will be
more likely to make positive contributions to their community. 377
Today, rehabilitation is most associated with treatment and formal
programs calculated to enhance the personal and professional capacities of the
individual. This programmatic support may cover alcohol and substance abuse
disorders, co-occurring mental health disorders, anger management, skills
development, vocational training, and educational programs. 378 An individual
with alcohol or drug disease is an appropriate subject of punishment under the
rehabilitative purpose of punishment because punishment is an opportunity
for the disease to be treated and its effects to be mitigated. Drug courts
demonstrate this principle in action. 379 Data also shows that treatment can be
an effective means to address the disease and reduce recidivism. 380
In short, the purposes of punishment do not undermine the conclusion
that criminal punishment may be imposed on an individual with an alcohol or
drug disease. Indeed, each purpose, especially incapacitation and
rehabilitation, provides support for the imposition of such punishment.

375. United States v. Garthus, 652 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2011).
376. United States v. Cole, 622 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
377. Sidhu, supra note 367, at 679.
378. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 5 (“Effective treatment attends to multiple
needs of the individual, not just his or her drug abuse. To be effective, treatment must address the
individual’s drug abuse and any associated medical, psychological, social, vocational, and legal
problems. It is also important that treatment be appropriate to the individual’s age, gender, ethnicity,
and culture.”).
379. See supra notes 353–56 and accompanying text.
380. See Ethan G. Kalett, Note, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (Of Prison): An Evaluation of “Anonymous
Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 139 (1996) (“Yet most studies show that
while traditional parole/probation has failed to decrease recidivism in addicted offenders, placing
such offenders in drug and alcohol treatment programs does decrease recidivism.”); see also id. at 149
(“A.A. itself claims to have lowered recidivism among criminal alcoholics by 60% . . . .”).
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Evidence of Choice

The prior sections suggest that the status-conduct distinction is
inadequate because it fails to require an individual with an addiction to show,
as required by Justice White’s controlling opinion, that the disease of
addiction actually precluded compliance with the law. At the same time, the
alternative approach championed by the Fourth Circuit, which accepted the
diagnosis of an addiction as sufficient proof of involuntariness, is also flawed.
It is clear as a medical and clinical matter, not to mention from parallel legal
contexts, that a diagnosis is not an automatic or categorical bar to seeking and
obtaining help. It also is clear from the previous discussion that an individual
with an addiction who violates the law is a proper subject of criminal
punishment, even if the unlawful act is symptomatic of the disease. This
section describes how the Fourth Circuit should have engaged in an
individualized inquiry to determine voluntariness in the case before it.
Showing of Involuntariness. The question left unanswered by Justice
White’s concurring opinion and by the Fourth Circuit opinion is: What would
it take for an individual with an addiction to demonstrate that their actions
were involuntary for purposes of criminal law? Based on the foregoing
discussion, several factors emerge that may help courts determine whether
such conduct is involuntary.
First, an individual who drinks or uses drugs may have a conscious
awareness, between periods of consumption or even during periods of
consumption, that drinking or using is problematic for them. 381 These
moments of awareness serve as opportunities to address the disease and its
manifestations. 382 A court seeking to determine whether an individual with
drug or alcohol disease should be held criminally liable for a prohibited act
should therefore ask whether any such opportunities, or “lucid intervals,”
existed. If they did, and the individual still did not take meaningful, ongoing
action, the responsibility for the uncorrected manifestation of the disease may
be attributed to the individual; the decision to forgo help is itself a choice. 383
Second, even if the individual has the opportunity to seek help, actually
obtaining help may be a different story. An individual wanting to address
their addiction to drugs or alcohol generally has options, including calling
emergency services and detoxifying or receiving other treatment in a hospital
setting. But it also may be possible that, although the individual has made
meaningful efforts to seek treatment, treatment is not yet feasible. Some
facilities may be at capacity or may have waiting lists for admission,
effectively precluding the individual from obtaining help notwithstanding
381. See supra notes 321–22 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 333–37 and accompanying text.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021)

2021]

CRIMINAL LAW x ADDICTION

1137

their demonstrated desire to address their addiction. 384 As with the Ninth
Circuit case in which homeless individuals avoided criminal liability because
area homeless shelters were full, 385 a court exploring whether an individual
with an addiction may be held criminally responsible should examine both the
affirmative efforts made by the individual to receive help and the availability
of any appropriate help.
Third, even if the individual is unable to receive help, despite the
reasonable pursuit of it, the absence of any immediately accessible treatment
opportunities is not a license to drink or use. Since addiction is not
monolithic, it presents itself differently for different people, so a court should
look into the conditions during any period in which help was sought but could
not be secured.
For example, an individual who drinks or uses in this interval on account
of averting severe withdrawal symptoms may be able to make a stronger
argument of involuntariness than a person who used without withdrawal
symptoms looming over their head. 386 Individuals with drug or alcohol disease
may hunt for their drug of choice specifically to avoid or at least delay
withdrawal symptoms. 387 The importance of withdrawal in the context of
criminal law finds support in existing law. In both Robinson and Powell, the
Supreme Court pointed out that neither defendant was drinking alcohol to
address actual or imminent withdrawal symptoms. 388 In Powell, the plurality
additionally suggested that the loss of control or volition over drinking might
occur when the individual drinks alcohol in response to withdrawal. 389
384. See Cristina Redko, Richard C. Rapp & Robert G. Carlson, Waiting Time as a Barrier to
Treatment Entry: Perceptions of Substance Users, 36 J. DRUG ISSUES 831, 837–38, 841–42 (2006);
Stacey C. Sigmon, Taylor A. Ochalek, Andrew C. Meyer, Bryce Hruska, Sarah H. Heil, Gary J.
Badger, Gail Rose, John R. Brooklyn, Robert P. Schwartz, Brent A. Moore & Stephen T. Higgins,
Correspondence, Interim Buprenorphine vs. Waiting List for Opioid Dependence, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2504, 2504 (2016) (“Despite the demonstrated efficacy of maintaining abstinence by treating patients
with opioid agonists, patients can remain on clinic waiting lists for months . . . .”).
385. See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
920 F.3d 584 (2019).
386. A number of excellent articles describe the “sheer hell” that is withdrawal. See, e.g.,
O’Malley, supra note 91; Brian Rinker, What “Dope Sick” Really Feels Like, CAL. HEALTHLINE (Feb.
8, 2019), https://californiahealthline.org/news/what-dope-sick-really-feels-like/ [https://perma.cc/
VPE4-JARY]; Matthew Rozsa, Opioid Addicts on How They Got Addicted, SALON (May 24, 2019,
10:00 P.M.), https://www.salon.com/2019/05/24/opioid-addicts-on-how-they-got-addicted [https://
perma.cc/G72K-98SF].
387. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that treatment designed to reduce
withdrawal symptoms “makes it easier to stop the drug use”).
388. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 525 (1968) (plurality opinion); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 662 (1962).
389. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 525 (“[I]t cannot accurately be said that a person is truly unable to
abstain from drinking unless he is suffering the physical symptoms of withdrawal.”); see also L.S. Tao,
Alcoholism as a Defense to Crime, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 68, 77 (1969) (suggesting that an
individual with alcoholism may not avoid criminal responsibility if “he retains mastery over his
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These three nonexhaustive factors—awareness and attendant action,
availability of help, and nature of the addiction—should help guide a court’s
particular, individualized inquiry as to whether the individual possesses the
culpability sufficient for criminal liability to be appropriate. The Fourth
Circuit did not engage in this analysis, categorically equating the label or
diagnosis of addiction with involuntariness. 390
To be sure, the case rose to the Fourth Circuit on a motion to dismiss
and, on such a motion, a court is to accept the factual allegations of the
nonmovant as true. 391 But conclusory allegations—that an individual is
compelled to drink on account of the disease of addiction—are insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. 392 The complaint must contain factual support
enabling the court to infer that the allegations are plausible. 393
Application. Here, the Fourth Circuit accepted the five plaintiffs’ bare
conclusions that they were compelled to drink, without digging deeper as an
evidentiary approach would require and as a sufficient analysis of a motion to
dismiss does require. A proper examination of the complaint indicates that
one plaintiff would survive the motion, while four would fall short.
The complaint states that the five plaintiffs “suffer from alcohol use
disorder,” which is a “disease,” and that the plaintiffs “have a profound drive
or craving to use alcohol, which is a compulsive or non-volitional aspect of
addiction.” 394 This blanket statement is inadequate to surpass a motion to
dismiss as it equates the disease itself with compulsion, restates a legal
conclusion that any drinking by an individual with the disease is
nonvolitional, does not indicate that the individuals lacked any lucid intervals,
and does not indicate whether the plaintiffs lacked meaningful options to
respond to their addiction. An individualized inquiry under the evidentiary
model would further probe each of the plaintiffs’ specific conditions and
circumstances.
The complaint notes that the named plaintiff, Cary Hendrick, has been
in treatment programs, has not been able to stay sober, and has withdrawal
symptoms without alcohol. 395 Previous unsuccessful efforts at mitigation do
not, however, entitle the individual to forgo future efforts. Indeed, treatment
course of behavior insofar as he could stop drinking without triggering these serious physical
withdrawal symptoms”).
390. See Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
391. Hendrick v. Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868, 875–76 (W.D. Va. 2017), vacated sub nom.,
Manning, 930 F.3d at 264.
392. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (“It is the conclusory nature of [a plaintiff’s]
allegations . . . that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”).
393. See id. at 678–80.
394. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 23–25, Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868
(No. 7:16-CV-0095) [hereinafter Complaint].
395. Id. ¶¶ 46–47.
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programs are not designed to be the be-all-end-all; they are the training
wheels that are designed to empower the individual to maintain sobriety
through their own developed support system. 396 Moreover, it is not
uncommon for individuals to receive treatment multiple times before
treatment sticks or clicks. 397 In addition, individuals may enter treatment at
one level, only to require more acute care. 398 A person with a visual
impairment would be expected to continue finding corrective lenses that were
effective rather than proceeding through life blind, consequences be damned.
Critically, the complaint does not reveal that Hendrick lost awareness of the
manifestations of his disease, was deprived of any opportunities to receive
additional or higher levels of care, or was compelled to use while awaiting
access to appropriate care. 399 If anything, the complaint describes an
individual who tried treatment and tried no more. 400 Recovery only “works if
you work it,” 401 or put forth persistent and ongoing corrective efforts. The
same flaws and shortcomings in Hendrick’s allegations also appear for the
other plaintiffs. 402
The only plaintiff that may satisfy a motion to dismiss under the
evidentiary model is Ryan Williams. The complaint alleges that he suffers
withdrawal symptoms if he does not consume alcohol. 403 This allegation,
accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, would cut in favor of a finding
of involuntary use of alcohol. Whether this fact holds up can and should be
assessed at a later phase of the case.
Whether an individual with addiction to drugs or alcohol is a proper
subject of criminal punishment requires a fact-based inquiry. This section
demonstrates—through the application of the evidentiary model to Manning—
396. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 9.
397. See Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80, at 23 (“When a person recovering from an
addiction relapses, it indicates that the person needs to speak with their doctor to resume treatment,
modify it, or try another treatment.”); Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 10 (“Successful
treatment for addiction typically requires continual evaluation and modification as appropriate,
similar to the approach taken for other chronic diseases.”).
398. See Leslie C. Morey, Patient Placement Criteria: Linking Typologies to Managed Care, 20
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RSCH. WORLD 36, 39 (1996).
399. The complaint states that he suffers from seizures if he does not have access to alcohol, but
also adds that he takes medication to control the seizures. Complaint, supra note 394, ¶ 47.
400. See Complaint, supra note 394, ¶ 46.
401. See Recovery Slogans, 12STEP.ORG, https://www.12step.org/references/commonly-used/
recovery-slogans/ [https://perma.cc/5PD5-9QHG].
402. See Complaint, supra note 394, ¶¶ 53, 59 (Bryan Manning); id. ¶¶ 66, 72 (Ryan Williams);
id. ¶ 79 (Richard Deckerhoff); id. ¶¶ 93, 97 (Richard Eugene Walls). To be sure, it seems that some
of the plaintiffs may have been arrested without having any alcohol in their system, see. id. ¶ 52
(noting that Manning was arrested due to “smelling like alcohol”); id. ¶¶ 77, 92 (asserting that Mr.
Walls was arrested due to “empty beer cans” being nearby), which would seem to run afoul of
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
403. Complaint, supra note 394, ¶ 73. The named plaintiff also references withdrawal symptoms,
id. ¶ 47, but also concedes that the symptoms are managed with medication, id.
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that the proposed model is workable, and therefore has the hallmarks of a
sound and durable legal regime.
CONCLUSION
This Article aims to update the response to the fundamental question of
whether an individual who possesses an alcohol or substance use disorder may
face criminal liability for conduct that is symptomatic of that disorder. A
renewed understanding of the relationship between criminal law and addiction
is required for several reasons, including the evolution of social attitudes and
scientific knowledge respecting addiction, and a crisis within the federal
circuit court of appeals on the applicability of criminal liability to conduct
symptomatic of addiction.
This Article argues that the majority approach taken by the federal
appellate courts wrongly asks only whether the criminal offense contains an
actus reus and that the Fourth Circuit approach wrongly immunizes the
individual with an addiction from criminal liability, with both regimes staking
out categorical rules that fail to probe the individualized nature of addiction.
An individualized inquiry—guided by considerations of conscious awareness,
practical opportunities to receive help, and the nature of the addiction—would
properly reflect the Supreme Court’s guideposts in this field, match
Congress’s determinations in the disability space, and align with the fact that
addiction is not a monolithic disease but one whose presentations and related
experiences are different for each afflicted person. Moreover, and critically, an
individualized inquiry would be consistent with the recognition—supported
by case law, scientific information, addiction treatment programs, and twelvestep fellowship literature—that an individual with the disease of addiction
generally is capable of exercising choice and that choice is an essential
predicate to criminal punishment. As such, the bar to show involuntariness is
high, and thus addiction may function as a limited and narrow shield to
criminal liability.
This Article seeks to assist courts, litigants, and the public by providing a
descriptive survey of the relationship between criminal law and addiction and
by suggesting how that relationship may be refined to best pay tribute both to
current knowledge on the subject and to core principles of criminal
responsibility.

